The legal industry and the evolving legal service delivery model is a terrific story, a fascinating puzzle and an entrenched maze of narratives. The traditional law firm partnership business model[1] is being significantly impacted by a combination of competitive alternative legal service providers, the expanding reach of technology, and the changing behaviour of the retail and corporate consumer of legal services.

The Grand Delusion that all is well in the land of law (and BigLaw in particular) is blinding many firms to the need for reconstruction. … Unfortunately, too many people have a vested interest in the old model continuing to work; but the Emperor’s clothes are nevertheless increasingly being seen for what they are.

– Stephen Mayson, Law Firm Partnership: the Grand Delusion[2]

Overview

For the legal profession, an unsustainable value proposition and new competitive forces threaten BigLaw and the traditional law firm’s future landscape.  Law firms are moving into a new digital age and their outdated business model and organizational structure will need to be modernized, and in many cases, reinvented.[3] If today’s law firms fail to innovate their business model and stake their claim in the evolving legal industry, they risk a limited opportunity to not just survive, but thrive:[4]

“For me, it evokes the image of these [traditional law] firms as tiny dots, spiraling around a black hole. The spiral continues year after year with some firms being pulled into the hole. A few pulling farther away, and the majority caught in slowly decaying orbits.

While a nice visual, what does it mean? It means it is easy to get fixed into complacency as you spiral seeing the same players next to you year after year. You don’t perceive things changing much even though seen from afar, change is clear. …

The fragility of the business model is on full display and it doesn’t take much to tap one from spiraling the black hole to falling in.”

A law firm providing excellent legal advice and services is a basic client expectation. This is table stakes.[5]  The traditional law firm’s reliance on practice excellence, pedigree, and reputation—without more—is no longer sufficient to be competitive or sustainable.[6] Law is not exclusively about law firms anymore, and that is putting enormous pressure on the traditional law firm structure and economic model.[7] Clients are looking for and expecting from their law firms greater efficiency, price predictability, and cost-effectiveness in the legal services they contract for and receive. A sustainable “value proposition” in the new normal requires a new business model that incorporates and delivers effective legal service delivery (utilizing technology, process, and alternative staffing models: the right person – lawyer or otherwise – for the right task), practice excellence, and customer service. In short: the right resources, doing the right work, in the most cost effective and efficient manner[8] – not your typical law firm.

Thomson Reuters and Georgetown Law’s 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market (“the 2018 Georgetown Report”) compares the strategies of traditional law firms to the “French strategy of the Maginot Line — a seemingly impregnable fortification that provided a false sense of security” until it was easily defeated at the outset of the second World War. Weak business leadership and management organizational structure and talent, strategic blind spots, “partnership drag” decision-making inertia, and unwillingness to adapt transformative strategies to changing 21^st Century conditions have lead traditional law firm decision-makers to ignore signs that the legal world has progressed and current strategies may not be working.[9]

In the main, most firms haven’t innovated their business model [law firm partnership model] …  the uptake is going to increase … as we look at how we change the delivery model, there’s going to be implications for how you structure the business to maximise opportunity.

– A platform for change: Dentons global chief innovation officer John Fernandez on his new role[10]

Understanding which business models can succeed in these challenging times is critical. The macroeconomic statistics are sobering, and traditional law firms continue to have “trouble distinguishing year-to-year movement in metrics with underlying change in industry economics”.[11] Corporate demand for legal services continues to grow – the legal industry remains one of the most profitable personal services businesses in the world[12] – but the traditional law firm share continues to shrink.[13]  Flat demand for law firm services, declining profit margins, falling productivity, loss of market share to alternative legal service providers, and price pressure, are gradually undermining the foundations of firm profitability.[14] As the traditional law firm’s revenue growth is challenged by the modest demand growth environment, margin growth is challenged by expense pressures (i.e. infrastructure and technology investments, marketing and business development costs). It will be the law firms who can adapt and grow profitably (by increasing both revenues and margins) who will survive and distance themselves from the growing number of law firms who cannot meet these competitive and financial challenges.[15] For those traditional law firms that fail or refuse to appropriately adapt their business and legal service delivery model, there is an expectation of “further consolidation and some law firm dissolutions as these weaker firms lose their ability to compete”.[16]

The consolidations underscore the difficulties smaller firms face in staying afloat as the legal landscape adjusts to changes in traditional ways of practicing law.

– 2017 Record Year for Law Firm Mergers[17]

As the legal services delivery model evolves nationally and across the globe, not surprisingly, there are implications for how the traditional law firm will need to adapt and structure its business model to remain competitive and maximize opportunity. New business models deployed in the legal marketplace must be supported by new capabilities, processes, and most importantly organizational structures.[18] Law firm business models to be successful will require working with an ecosystem of legal and non-legal partners to create best-in-class offerings, and take advantage of technology developments that make it more efficient and less expensive to reach legal consumers and provide services – which in turn will increase demand for those legal services.

In this environment, one key message for the legal profession is that technology – while extremely important as “part of the solution” – cannot be seen as “the solution”, or as a shortcut to recapture years of competitive gaps as against the best in class. Legal technology should be seen and recognized as a tool (albeit an important tool) to boost the implementation of an appropriate, competitive, and well-designed business and operating model for the law firm’s ‘new normal’.

Ten years ago, law firm managing partners would have said that law firms would largely stay the same. That’s completely changed. … Law firms are moving into a new digital age and many believe the current business model will need to evolve, or in some cases, be reinvented.

– BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017[19]

Introduction

Until relatively recently, throughout the world, legal services have by law only been delivered to the consumer by traditional law firms that are wholly owned and controlled by lawyers (the law firm partnership model[20] ). Although the legal profession across the Western world has been an historically successful business from a “money making perspective”, the world is changing quickly now and the legal profession’s new challengers are technologically inspired, vigorous in implementing new, alternative, and competitive business and legal service delivery models, and hungry to disrupt the business relationships of traditional law firms in order to foster new relationships for themselves.

The root cause is the dissatisfaction of the buyers of legal services and the feeling that the traditional law firms have just not been really listening. The clatter we hear now is the sound of clients taking to the streets!

– The new spectrum of legal services[21]

The rules are changing in the legal industry and “lawyers have lost track of the game. Under the old rules, lawyers practiced law. That was it — that was the rule. Under the new rules, many parties provide services that fall under the general umbrella of legal services”.[22] And, as a result of technology and the internet the number of players is unlimited and they come from all over the world: “jurisdictional boundaries mean less and less”.[23]  The legal service delivery model is shifting from a reactive, inefficient, expensive, single-channel routine to a dynamic, client-centric, cost effective, multi-provider opportunity.[24] Mobile, social, networked computing has changed the way companies and people work – we are now massively connected – enabling NewLaw[25] and a broad range of alternative legal service providers to connect with retail and corporate clients efficiently in real time, whether around the corner or on the other side of the world.[26]

The internet is the most revolutionary technology brought to mainstream use since the printing press.

– The Next Phase of Legal Technology Has Already Been Built[27]

The practice of law will see more change over the next decade than it has seen in the past century. Most traditional law firms are not prepared for the technological and economic reality of today’s changing legal market, failing to proactively innovate,[28] adopt and initiate efficient processes,[29] technology,[30] and – most importantly – a competitive business model to meet the changing demands of business.

To safeguard their position in this new reality, traditional law firms will need to rethink key elements of their leadership, management, and business model, and capture the advantages presented by legal technology and new legal service delivery models.[31]  However, because of the toxic “me-first law firm partnership” culture and the restrictive business model of traditional law firms, most won’t – or will do too little, too late, and/or not the right things to remain competitive. Why? Because the traditional “outdated law firm partnership model” encourages – incentivizes – partners to fixate on their own short-term gains rather than the long-term success of the firm, and undermines leadership, long-term strategy and investment, and innovation. The “sorry fact” is “that many senior lawyers really don’t care what happens to the firm the day after they retire”.[32] This is the “war that’s been raging within law firms”, the fight for control of the business between individual ‘me-first’ partners and the law firm leadership, with the firm trying to look long term and the partner level lawyer looking short term and with a ‘self-interest’. [33]

The culture and business model of traditional law firms cannot be permitted to remain stagnant.[34]  As the economy and the legal industry changes, BigLaw and traditional law firm business model and culture needs to adapt, looking toward the long-term success of the firm and its clients.  Unfortunately, many of the legal profession’s leaders are waiting too long to adjust their business model, their vision, their strategy, and their culture. This could be because taking action may mean walking away from the “traditional”, the familiar,[35] and what was historically successful,[36] which can appear risky to a ‘risk averse’ profession (even as evidence mounts of their failure)[37] – or it may be “partnership drag”, or possibly just  that enacting change is viewed as requiring more effort than it is worth.[38] Whatever the explanation, failure to take action, to take control of their business and delivery model at a pivotal moment in legal history, will likely mean for many law firms that they miss what may be a time sensitive “Kodak moment” – a limited opportunity – to address their future market success.

The advantage you have yesterday, will be replaced by the trends of tomorrow. You don’t have to do anything wrong, as long as your competitors catch the wave and do it right, you can lose out and fail. To change and improve yourself is giving yourself a second chance. To be forced by others to change, is like being discarded.

– Rahul Gupta[39]

With the possible exception[40] of the global elite of 10 or 20 BigLaw firms[41] (that have been transforming themselves toward globally integrated business solution providers[42]), and differentiated law firms effectively practicing in high-stakes ‘bet the company’ matters,[43]  the main reasons[44] for the status quo for much of the legal profession across the world appears to be a lack of coherent vision and strategy for the future, an outdated business model and organizational structure, and the ‘partnership drag’ of a “me-first” law firm partnership culture.

Thanks to legal technology and AI, NewLaw alternative legal service providers, and modern ABS contenders[45] undermining the foundation of BigLaw and traditional law firms’ creaky “lawyer only” business model, law as a profession will look markedly different in 10 years. These factors will reshape the law firm industry worldwide. The message of the story is if traditional law firms do not change, they will be substantially replaced in the competitive game.[46]

Traditional law firms that fail to adapt their business model to the new realities that the legal market and legal technology presents risk losing their corporate (and retail) clients to more forward thinking law practices and NewLaw alternative legal service providers, or even going out of business entirely.[47] It is the legal profession’s quiet crisis, and it is about to get louder:[48]

“As an industry, legal is doing relatively well. Contrary to the headlines, demand is not flat. Rather, demand for law firm services is flat.[49] According to HBR [consulting],[50] the ACC [Association of Corporate Counsel],[51] and LEI [Legal Executive Institute],[52] the surplus is being captured by [corporate] clients and, to a lesser extent (for now), their alternative service providers.”

Business is crying out for a different style.

– Sarah Thornton, General Counsel, Brisbane Airport Corporation[53]

The Game has Changed: Reality on the Ground Impacting Traditional Law Firm

Worldwide, the legal profession’s law firm partnership model is exhibiting the “typical traits of a maturing market” including: shrinking demand and increasing supply of professional talent, availability of service substitutes, extensive competition, marketing of professional services, downward shift on the value curve toward commodity type service categories, profit squeeze, greater client expectations, more specialization, demand for compensation based upon performance, alternative billing methods, and price pressure and sensitivity.[54] There does not seem to be an end in sight, as revenue growth stagnates, downward pressure on rates continues, lawyer productivity declines and industry consolidation follows this “textbook path”.[55]

There are systemic challenges confronting traditional law firms: minimal capital invested in research and development; an economic “lawyer only” model that rewards inefficiency more than efficiency; limited understanding of the increasingly complex business of national and multinational corporate clients (especially contrasted with in-house counsel and the Big Four[56] multidisciplinary accounting firms); and a failure to consistently appreciate that “legal” problems are, from the corporate client perspective, “business challenges”.[57]

Historically, one of the biggest stumbling blocks blocking law firms from adopting new technologies is the industry-standard billable hour. When charging clients hourly, there’s little incentive for lawyers to adopt technologies that will allow them to save time, as doing so will decrease their overall profits. And since time is money, there is also little incentive to spend it investigating or inventing innovations.

– David Tal[58]

The traditional law firm model is often seen to sell the client a ‘Cadillac’, even when the client only needs or wants a ‘Ford’:[59]

“The traditional model has two essential features: charging on a time basis; and measuring performance against financial targets. For clients, this means that they pay for legal services in a way which has no relationship to the value they receive; in fact, the less efficient the service is, the more they pay. For lawyers, it means that their effort is recognised and rewarded not on the basis of skill, experience, complexity, efficiency or innovation, but on how much time they spend doing the work. It also means that they are in perpetual competition with their own colleagues. None of these outcomes is conducive to cooperation, collegiality, trust or functional relationships. They produce the opposite effect.”

By redesigning the legal services delivery model, many of the competing NewLaw business models promise the ‘Ford’, with prices to match.[60] It is clear that, as traditional law firms compete for legal business, they face new and difficult business model competitor(s). As noted by one legal commentator, “the competition that kills you does not look like you”.[61]

The [ABA] Commission pointed out that [the] traditional law firm model of billing by the hour means law firms have less incentive to become more efficient.  … Lawyers are slow to change and reactive rather than proactive. … The legal profession “has not yet fully harnessed the power of technology to improve the delivery of, and access to, legal services”.

–  Is the Legal Profession on The Cusp of Uber-Like Disruption? The ABA Commission’s Report on The Future of Legal Services in The U.S.[62]

(a) Major Challenges

The market will not continue to tolerate the inefficiencies of the traditional law firm model. Like the  2018 Georgetown Report,[63] Thomson Reuters and Georgetown Law’s 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Market (“the 2017 Georgetown Report”)[64] provides a broad range of data confirming weaknesses in the traditional law firm model: (a) flat demand for law firm services in a market with growing demand; (b) shrinking leverage (one of the cornerstones of the BigLaw model);[65] (c) reduced realization; (d) intense competition; and (e) the failure of most traditional law firms to innovate in a market demanding it.[66] According to the 2017 Georgetown Report, BigLaw and traditional law firms are facing at least three major challenges in their legal corporate market:[67]

• A buyer’s market in which corporate clients demand greater value for their legal spend – the value measured by “outputs” such as efficiency, predictability, and cost-effectiveness in the delivery of legal services (as opposed to “inputs” such as billable hours).
• Corporate client’s tendency to disaggregate legal work and allocate responsibilities for different aspects of a single matter to different law firms, in-house lawyers, and alternative legal service providers.
• The growing segmentation of the legal market as corporate clients move certain types of work “down market” – rewarding those law firms (big and small) responding proactively to their demands, and severing even long-term relationships with those law firms that do not. (Note: approximately 20 traditional law firms are pulling away from the group once collectively referred to as the ‘AmLaw 200’ and more recently the ‘AmLaw 100’).[68]

Stratification in the market will continue as top-tier firms’ appeal to a different set of clients than middle-market law firms. These competitive differences will keep firms at all tiers afloat, but their respective ranks will surely thin.[69]

The Georgetown Report also cites, ‘erosion of the traditional law firm franchise,’ a euphemism for ‘clients no longer need large law firms to handle many legal tasks.’

– Mark Cohen[70]

According to a recent ALM Intelligence survey, 66% of law firm leaders said they were “somewhat to very concerned” about alternative legal services providers and accounting firms encroaching on their business, and 70% of all law firms surveyed said they considered accounting and audit firms a “major threat” to their firm’s market share.[71] Instead of competing against other traditional law firms for new business, law firms are increasingly worried about losing market share to alternative legal service providers and corporate in-house legal departments[72] – indeed, the biggest competitors going forward may not be other law firms but rather retail and corporate clients looking to alternative legal service providers.

A “relationship-only business approach to buying (and selling) legal services is now a thin minority among the largest corporate clients. It is replaced by a professional, business-driven approach to sourcing”.[73]

In legal centres around the world there will be “big changes in the next three to four years and it will all be about scale and price efficiency” because currently “the price point is wrong, lawyers are not prepared to provide a service at a relatively low price, and the transparency is not there. As this is corrected over the next few years, there will be a lot of consolidation” because it is very difficult for traditionally structured law firms to make the right decisions in a rapidly changing market, and easier for alternative business structures, which [are] generally adopting corporate models”.[74]

Building on the increased merger activity of 2016 and 2017, well led and managed law firms will continue to expand their national or global reach through mergers and acquisitions, allowing them to stay competitive. Though middle-market firms are taking steps to remain competitive, there will likely be a reduction in the number of single-city law firms with national practices and the ones that remain appear liable for either acquisition or dissolution.[75]

As a result of the challenging market conditions, in the U.S. alone dozens of traditional law firms have failed or merged in 2017 – either through complete dissolution or acquisition – and the pace of law firm dissolutions will likely continue into 2018 and beyond.[76]

It has been predicted by a number of legal commentators, including law firm finance experts, that a third of the top 300 UK law firms will disappear by 2022, and that “there would also be at least 10 listed law firms, with a combined capitalization of £2bn”.[77]

We are already seeing the global elite firms, the big American and magic circle firms, apply more and more pressure on the middle-market players who are definitely getting the squeeze. Increasingly the trend for them will be to merge or specialise – standing still is not an option.

– John Llewellyn-Lloyd, corporate finance director and barrister, Arden Partners, UK[78]

The game has changed. And the change will only accelerate with more legal work shifting from traditional law firms to new model law firms or alternative legal service providers.[79]

(b) The Impact of General Counsel

With respect to the legal market nationally and internationally – while BigLaw and traditional law firms have long been fixtures and big budget line items at major and midlevel corporations, since the global financial crisis of 2008 they have encountered more than their share of challenges.[80] There has been a growing trend among corporate consumers, especially Fortune 500 companies with sophisticated General Counsel and in-house legal departments, to use alternative providers to traditional law firms.[81] Overall, with some exceptions for unsophisticated in-house legal departments in Canada[82] and smaller and mid-size corporations,[83] from a global perspective gone are the days when a General Counsel and a full-service BigLaw or traditional law firm remain “married” for a long unexamined period of time. The trend today confirms that BigLaw is giving way to NewLaw and a broad range of alternative legal services providers that can be selected and configured — or reconfigured — to meet the specific needs of a particular corporation[84] (or even retail legal services consumer):[85]

“Legal consumers want their services delivered “faster, better, [and] cheaper.” They want easier access to the provider, better transparency and choice, lower cost, and faster deliver in addition to instant and ongoing connectivity with providers. …

Consumers [of legal services] dictate what is legal and when a lawyer is needed. Consumers are also the ones that decide what the appropriate resource is to perform the task. The alternative providers deliver automation, data, predictive tools, and analytics created to allow consumers to discover legal problems before they grow into problems.

The world has turned to digitization, forcing the legal industry to as well. The alternative providers and the Big Four accounting firms are filling that need to cater to the digital age. Law firms have been hesitant to move towards digitization seeing as how it affects profit-per-partner revenue. This has allowed the [alternative legal service] providers to be a more attractive option yet, growing their profits quickly in just a few short years.”

When a Fortune 500 GC sees that 46 percent of their peers have leveraged [a legal service outsource firm], it is not risky any longer.

– Connie Brenton, Chairman, Corporate Legal Operations Consortium[86]

Beyond traditional law firm competitors, law firms face formidable competition from alternative legal service providers (including their own corporate clients’ in-house legal departments).[87] NewLaw alternative legal service providers are growing rapidly (albeit from a very low base),[88] and they are picking off low to medium-value areas of legal work, directly impacting and depressing demand growth for traditional law firms.[89]

General Counsel and in-house counsel “stand at a pivotal point in the history of the legal industry”.[90] The role of the in-house lawyer has evolved dramatically in the past 10 years, shifting from a “siloed” legal division (providing legal advice – broadly defined – and managing regulatory and litigation risk) to one where the General Counsel of sophisticated corporations has a seat at the executive leadership table and is integral to the business over and above just providing legal advice: incorporating governance and risk, enhancing economic value for the business (with strategic and business advice), and driving the need for traditional law firms to adapt.[91]

Over the next 10 years the General Counsel and in-house counsel role will continue its evolution from traditional, reactive lawyers to a strategic business unit composed of top legal talent and strategic, process-savvy operators who “embrace innovations in technology, new service delivery models, and increased operational efficiencies”.[92] And corporate legal departments will increasingly be tasked to reduce external legal costs and operate more efficiently internally than ever before.[93] As a result, many legal departments are hiring legal operations professionals to help manage the in-house legal department, and oversee and ensure external legal services are being provided more effectively and with better financial discipline.

As such, in-house law departments continue to grow and keep more work in-house, and although some traditionalists view this as cyclical, the rapid growth of the Corporate Legal Operations Consortium (CLOC) reflect the long term strategy of sophisticated General Counsel and their in-house law departments’ continued progress and drive towards efficiency. With a vision to provide a “seamless legal ecosystem that delivers corporate legal support to small, medium and large businesses with peak efficiency,” Legal Department Operations professionals have become highly visible, and likely to increase pricing pressure to law firms.[94]

Not surprisingly, faced with pressure to do more with less and a heightened attention on resource optimization – the right resources, doing the right work, in the most cost effective and efficient manner – General Counsel and their legal operations team will increasingly be utilizing cost-effective alternative legal service providers, alternative staffing models, and evolving technologies.[95]

How much are corporations in-sourcing legal services? A lot. The trend is large and longstanding.  Over the last two decades, the number of lawyers working in corporations has more than tripled … 7.5x faster than law firms over the last 20 years. … How long into the future will this trend continue? What might curtail this trend?

– Bill Henderson, How Much Are Corporations In-Sourcing Legal Services[96]

Lawyers and the traditional law firm are no longer seen as “the straw that stirs the drink”,^[97] but rather one feature in a broader supply chain.  For General Counsel “its getting harder and harder to see the value proposition with traditional outside counsel”^[98] as legal costs are seen to be disproportionate to value.^[99] Corporate clients are demanding much more value from their legal service providers for their legal spend, more cost effective legal services, and problem solving that straddles disciplinary lines – such as law and business, technology (and the Fourth Industrial Revolution),^[100] and strategy.^[101]  Corporate clients are engaged in a “paradigm shift”:^[102]

“(1) an increasing willingness to procure services from providers with delivery models different than the traditional law firm partnership model; (2) taking more work in-house; (3) sourcing work—either internally or externally—to providers that are better aligned than law firms with the company’s risk tolerance and enterprise objectives; (4) utilizing technology, process, and ‘the right person for the right task’ to promote efficiency, mitigate risk, and reduce cost; and (5) rejecting the longstanding myth that only law firms—and lawyers—must perform all ‘legal’ tasks. Legal problems are increasingly viewed as business challenges raising legal issues.”

Within this paradigm shift, sophisticated General Counsel today – and most if not all General Counsel over the next 10 years – conceptualise service delivery in terms of end-to-end solutions. This means the optimal combination of people (lawyer or non-lawyer), process, and technology, and hybrid inside/outside sourcing models, to meet their organization’s business challenges that include legal issues. Within this new paradigm, General Counsel will be looking for innovative cost models for these end-to-end solutions, which produce the right balance of efficiency, quality, flexibility, and predictability.[103]

As General Counsel source work – either internally or externally – to providers that are better aligned than law firms with the company’s risk tolerance and enterprise objectives, expectations for legal work will expand exponentially over the next decade to include “negotiated service descriptions” as opposed to a “time-incurred basis”, and similar to in-house legal projects in sophisticated in-house legal departments,  “business intelligence and metrics mapped to project phases (i.e. status, progress, cost, known risks and mitigation strategies, resourcing) in real-time” for “impactful course corrections” and reporting within the organization.[104] Price certainty and predictability (subject to agreed assumptions and deviations), and reliable projections, is important for General Counsel in their increasingly important role within corporations: in line with other C-suite level officers, “legal leaders who repeatedly fall short in financial stewardship put themselves in peril”.[105]

To meet these needs and build a competitive business and delivery model in the new normal, traditional law firms need to strategically partner with multi-disciplinary professionals (i.e. accountants, business executives and managers, AI/IT support, data analysis, process and design analysis, business development and brand developers, etc.).[106]

There is considerable resistance by clients to current pricing structures, including billable hours.

– Canadian Bar Association^[107]

In this respect, the 2017 ACC Chief Legal Officers Survey notes that 46% of CLOs/GCs “definitely or may” replace a law firm for underperformance this year, with 26% of corporations saying they will make significant additions to their in-house lawyer staff. There is a lot of discontent underlying many corporate relationships with traditional law firms.[108]

The Georgetown Reports[109] note that corporate legal buyers are directing more work away from large law firms, electing to take it in-house or to other types of legal service providers (i.e. alternatives legal service delivery models to the traditional law firm partnership model). It also notes that corporate clients are increasingly sending work “down market” to smaller law firms with specific expertise and lower rates.[110] The inescapable conclusion:[111]

“Most large firms are confronting an existential crisis that demands an aggressive response lest they experience a collective ‘Kodak moment.’ So far, most firms have been at best reactive and at worst static to the rapidly changing market. That’s one reason why in-house legal departments and service providers now account for nearly half of total legal spend.”

The future belongs to those who learn more skills and combine them in creative ways.

–  Robert Greene, Mastery[112]

Corporate legal departments and alternative legal service providers have stepped in to fill the law firm vacuum. They tend to be more innovative than traditional law firms, utilizing technology, process, and new business models far more effectively than the traditional law firm “lawyer only” model that remain loathe to provide a meaningful seat at the management table to anyone but (rainmaker) lawyers. In-house legal departments, ABS, and other alternative legal service providers, in contrast, commonly function as corporations, not fiefdoms. Their DNA more closely resembles corporate clients than law firms do (enhancing operational flexibility),[113] and they accord business professionals (business executives and managers), technologists (IT engineers, law technologists, law data scientists), process experts (design thinkers), and others essential to the competitive delivery of legal services “commensurate status and rewards”.[114]

Law in 2018: It’s looking a little ‘Hunger Games’ out there.

– Claire Bushey, Crain’s Chicago Business[115]

(c) View Across Jurisdictions

In the UK we are seeing “corporate clients exercising their buying power to ensure that law firms become more efficient (including the more effective use of client-facing technology) and deliver their services in the manner and at the price point the client expects. Many firms, even for high-end work, are now providing a significant proportion of their work on an alternative fee basis, whether a fixed fee, capped fee or otherwise, thereby providing further incentives for law firms to improve their efficiency. There is also an increasing number of firms in the UK (including U.S. and other international firms)[116] converting to the alternative business structure (ABS), enabling non-lawyer ownership and/or professional leadership and management, and the expansion of their service offering beyond traditional legal advice. It also paves the way for investment in more efficient ways of delivering services”.[117] In Australia, the last decade has seen an unprecedented level of interest by international firms in their legal market and availability of ABSs, resulting in a number of cross-border mergers and enhanced competition.[118]

Canadian and American legal commentators have noted that “protected by legislated monopolies, law firms” in these countries have “been allowed to grow complacent and inefficient,”[119] and that “lawyer protectionism” is currently “the glue that binds the anachronistic self-regulated legal industry”.[120] The marketplace in North America is not aligned in respect to the interests of legal consumers (both retail and corporate) and the traditional law firm.  The legal profession is perceived as not fulfilling the expectations of the consumer, and the discontent runs deep:[121] over 70% of retail legal consumers in Canada and the U.S.^[122] – including small business owners[123] – cannot afford legal representation due to its excessive cost. In turn, looking for an appropriate value proposition, corporate clients and there General Counsel are migrating legal work away from BigLaw and traditional law firms in favour of innovative, efficient, and cost effective alternative legal service providers – in particular their own legal departments (reportedly now handling a majority of the corporation’s legal work in-house).^[124] It is fair to say that the current law firm business model is not perceived by either corporate or retail legal consumer to be working well. Accordingly, the BigLaw firm industry in the U.S. – with similar trends in Canada – remains in a channel of modest demand growth, where revenue increases are driven by rate hikes as opposed to demand – with high levels of dispersion and volatility:[125]

“Revenue growth during the past several years has come primarily via standard rate increases, as realization has been under pressure and the modest demand growth has added limited lift. Headcount growth has come in the form of increased lawyer leverage, as equity partner headcount has remained essentially flat. And margin growth, where firms have been able to achieve it, has come in large part from overhead expense controls as the industry has become leaner. Looking out to 2018, we project that industry revenue growth and profit per equity partner growth will remain in the mid-single-digit range on average. Behind these average results, we expect to see variability in individual firm performance, which will continue to drive consolidation[126] in the industry.”

Law firms … across the country will grapple with a market where revenue increases are driven by rate hikes, not demand … .  The slow-growth environment has created a hyper-competitive market … . This higher level of competition extends to competition for matters, for clients, and for talent.

– Claire Bushey, Crain’s Chicago Business[127]

In other industries, similar monopolistic restrictions on competition to protect the industry players might be considered anticompetitive and illegal.[128] Ultimately for sophisticated corporate clients, it is their organization and shareholders – and ultimately their consumers – who may believe they are not well served in Canada and the United States. Indeed, the General Counsel for one of the largest Banks in Canada – BMO’s Simon Fish – reportedly left an audience speechless earlier this year when he said that, all things being equal, “it doesn’t matter” if a company’s legal work was done by a law firm or an accounting firm.^[129]

The penetration of the Big Four is less obvious in North America but it’s growing with only regulatory hurdles in the way. … but sooner or later there will be cracks in that.

– Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game^[130]

Think about that – a majority of retail consumers and small businesses simply cannot afford to hire a lawyer for a legal issue they may have, and corporations are building their in-house legal departments as a specific strategy to address their concern about the value and cost of external legal services provided by the legal profession.

Globally, the success of ABSs indicates that corporate and retail clients are generally not concerned about sourcing their legal services from non-lawyers or non-traditional law firms. Clients still seek quality assurance and efficient delivery – but – whether this is achieved through traditional firms, alternative legal service providers, ABS, or even online solutions, is clearly of less importance.[131]

Both businesses and private individuals are increasingly willing to use the legal services of firms other than traditional law firms. More than half of all in-house legal departments now consider buying legal services from online providers such as LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer and LawDepot.

– Law Firms Face Increasing Competition from Non-Traditional Sources[132]

Internationally – with some limited headway in the U.S. and Canada[133] due to regulatory restrictions that are designed to raise impediments to their progress – competition is rising from alternative legal service providers, in-house legal departments, and in particular the Big Four accounting firms. The Big Four’s main progress appears to be in continental Europe and the Asia Pacific region. With the relative size of their respective legal arms (each targeting global legal revenues of US $1 Billion by 2021), the Big Four have the scale to disrupt the legal services market, but are still building a consistent legal brand to compete for high-quality law firm business:[134]

“The sheer depth and reach of the Big Four potentially makes them formidable competitors. The three largest of them combined have global revenues that exceed the aggregate revenues of the Global 100. They spend more on technology and training each year than the revenue of any law firm. They are very experienced at developing multi-point client relationships and “solutions” to clients’ business issues. While this is not the first time that the Big Four have built legal services businesses, this time they are building them as part of an integrated service offering rather than a standalone product.”

The Big Four are much more agile and creative than law firms. … the Big Four are being proactive and they’re expanding what they do because they want to be in a company’s boardroom every six months. So if there’s any more doubt that Canada’s major firms will have to spread their wings in Big Four fashion, it’s quickly disappearing.

– Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game^[135]

(d) Legal Profession Ripe for Disruption – Tipping Point

Those in the legal field know the only thing that is less risk adverse and moves slower than a law firm changing course is the Titanic in the Atlantic, and for good reason.[136] Most innovations and alternative legal service delivery models for legal services are occurring in the marketplace by companies trying to reach a segment of consumers that the legal profession has failed or refused to serve cost effectively at an affordable cost. Such innovations are largely happening in spite of regulations on the practice of law.[137]

If ever there was an industry ripe for disruption it is surely the legal profession, particularly here in North America – which is not surprising in light of two facts: (a) the traditional way of doing business for legal firms has historically been extremely profitable;[138] and (b) the legal profession’s perception of a protected monopoly on legal services to the corporate and retail consumer.[139] In addition to the exploitation of market power for private gain by the legal profession, there is “the inertia and unresponsiveness of an insulated service provider – a system that does not readily transform itself”.[140]  Accordingly, it is not surprising when representatives of some traditional law firms are heard even today saying that their “firm would never use AI to automate work they could charge for using manual methods – at least ‘until the barbarians’ are ‘at the gate’:[141]

“The negative aspect [is] so arrogant … to think that providing a better, more efficient, more valuable service to clients was something that had to be provided only at the last possible moment, almost at gun-point. It was if they were saying that law firms had some special right to offer, let’s put it bluntly, an exploitative value proposition to clients and say: ‘We define how we do things. Not you. You lot just pay for our inefficiencies.’”

Technology is affecting the way a number of sectors operate, having significant influence primarily on cost and time efficiency, but the legal sector is still reluctant to change. Although firms have started to invest in technological advancement, it has mainly been to help them maintain their profit margins. Firms have not truly attempted to understand what clients want to achieve through the use of technology, nor have they made much of an effort to pass on the savings to their clients. There is no doubt that a smattering of law firms and alternative legal services providers are genuinely making an attempt to push the boundaries, but the legal sector’s paradigm shift is still a long way off.

– David Burgess [142]

The “reality on the ground” is that the legal consumer appears to be of the opinion that “change is badly needed”,[143] particularly in light of the legal profession’s monopoly[144] in Canada and the U.S. on the delivery of legal services – and its hostility and resistance[145] to competition from innovative alternative legal service providers, and alternative business structures (ABS) to modernize the traditional law firm’s “lawyer only” business model[146] that will benefit the legal consumer. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that retail and corporate consumers are taking steps to retain alternative legal service providers that are ‘better, faster, cheaper’, and deliver ‘more-for-less’.[147]

50-70% of legal work could be automated. … there are thousands [of] programmers with decades [of] experience … working on the law, financial technology, legal technology, and I know that in the next 10 years all of this stuff will be automated.

– Josh Browder, entrepreneur who created ground-breaking DoNotPay chatbot[148]

In this environment, it is unlikely that the traditional law firm model will continue to dominate the legal marketplace over the next decade, particularly in light of the fact that the business model does not align well with the current direction in which up to 70% of the law may be carried out by AI technology and all legal documents and process will likely be automated within this 10 year time period (if not sooner).[149]

The global legal industry is at a tipping point[150] – the implementation of competitive alternative legal service providers and legal technology (Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Blockchain, Chatbots, etc.) is set to rewrite the rules for the legal profession – and that includes the legal profession in the protectionist jurisdictions of the U.S. and Canada:[151]

“We need to look at the application of AI in the legal context. … Machine Learning is now being applied in the legal sector to speed up manual tasks, improve accuracy, and streamline and automate processes.

Large [global elite] legal firms such as Dentons (with Nextlaw Labs) and Allen and Overy (with Fuse) are investing heavily in legal tech, companies focused on improving the legal sector through the latest advancements in Machine Learning. Thomson Reuters is doing the same with their Elite offerings (including their partners). They are investing in technology that does everything from document digestion, self-populating profiles to be used in expertise finding, automated work allocation, predictive data modeling, transaction mapping, and automated matter management. In that one sentence, I have listed several time-intensive processes that, thanks to Machine Learning, can be either automated or at the very least allow real-time, accurate on-demand information. …

This shift toward technology is affecting the sector, as firms are now able to streamline costs and act with more nimble operating cost models.”

Legal tech has cut its teeth on automating a range of standard legal tasks, but it is moving toward supporting more bespoke, specialized activities done by lawyers. … Globalization has pushed a lot of the innovation around legal services processes into the global arena.

– Dan Storbaek, What can Law Firms do to get ahead on Legal Tech[152]

The corporate segment of the legal marketplace is becoming a buyer’s market, and the trend will not be reversed.[153] Persistently and progressively across the globe, corporate clients are insisting that legal service be provided in ways that are more tailored to their precise needs and for fees that bear a more reasonable relationship to the value provided.[154]

Until recently this insistence has shown up as pricing pressure — clients demanding discounts. From a global perspective it has now moved to a more significant stage: corporate clients moving substantial amounts of their legal work to other providers — in-house, alternative providers or more efficient NewLaw firms — that deliver what they need more cost effectively.[155] Despite protectionist self-regulation in North America, General Counsel and their in-house legal departments are unilaterally effecting de facto re-regulation for corporate consumers of legal services[156]  – functioning “as a captive non-lawyer owner and investor in a ‘firm’ that has a single corporate client”:[157]

“[General Counsel and the in-house legal departments] have become corporate law’s largest providers, ‘insourcing’ work from law firms and/or outsourcing it to service providers. There are many key differences between [traditional law] firms and corporate legal departments and providers. While both operate under the same regulatory scheme [in the U.S. and Canada], the distinctions reflect the regulatory scheme’s failure to distinguish between legal ‘practice’ and the ‘business of delivering legal services.’ In-house departments and service providers have circumnavigated anachronistic legal self-regulation that is principally designed to insulate lawyers from competition.” [158]

In a legal industry where demand is largely flat, where corporations are bringing more work in-house, and where competition from alternative legal service providers and accounting firms is eating away at law firm revenue, keeping clients happy is vital to success.

–  Aebra Coe, Law 360[159]

What are sometimes referred to by old school law partners as the “good old days” are slowly coming to an end in protectionist monopoly based jurisdictions like Canada and the U.S., and are simply over in jurisdictions (such as the UK and Australia) in which policymakers encourage and support competition and innovation (i.e. alternative business structures) and protect the public interest (as opposed to the vested interests of the legal profession).[160]

The legal profession must come to terms with the reality that the traditional law firm model is no longer an adequate business response to competition from alternative legal providers that are innovative, competitive, in many cases multidisciplinary[161] and/or employing a technologically enhanced multijurisdictional ABS legal service delivery model (thereby decreasing the relevance of geographical boundaries),[162] and cost effective.^[163]

As noted by legal commentators such as Ken Grady, “the rules are changing in the legal industry” and most U.S. and Canadian “lawyers have lost track of the game. Under the old rules, lawyers practiced law. That was it — that was the rule. Under the new rules, many parties provide services that fall under the general umbrella of ‘legal services’. Sometimes, those services constitute ‘practicing law’ by almost any definition”, and “many times, the services fall into the not-well-defined universe”.[164] For North America, the change in the rules means that many more are playing the game: [165]

“Now, if the players were limited to those who do things in the U.S. [and Canada], we would have one story. But, the game is more interesting. The number of players is unlimited and they come from all over the world. And to make it really interesting, they don’t play by the U.S. [and Canadian] rules — they have their own rules.

As legal services get distributed around the world … understanding that the rules have changed will be a big deal.”

Chris Bentley, Executive Director of the Legal Innovation Zone at Ryerson University in Toronto, has noted that “jurisdictional boundaries mean less and less”.[166]  Although the legal profession’s regulators in Canada and the U.S. generally refuse to open up their “lawyer only” monopoly, they must still address the threat of competition and affordable cost effective legal services from UK and Australian ABSs – with internet based business models – entering their well-protected markets.[167]

The most important driver of structural change is technology. Not only does it require a different investment model and new skills, new tools disrupt the monopoly lawyers have on delivering legal services. Technology will ‘increase the ability of non-lawyers and clients themselves to undertake tasks previously the preserve of lawyers’. … This will in turn impact leverage at many firms.

– BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017[168]

The legal service delivery model is shifting from a reactive, inefficient, single-channel routine to a dynamic, client-centric, multi-provider opportunity.[169] Mobile, social, networked computing has changed the way companies and people work, enabling NewLaw legal service providers to connect and communicate with legal consumers and collaborate with partners around the globe in real time.[170] Greater connectivity means legal consumers will have greater access to legal service providers from literally all over the world – across borders – and this new global pool of legal service providers allows organizations to offer legal services that was traditionally the sole domain of BigLaw and the traditional law firm in the U.S. and Canada.

And … this impact on the traditional law firm – today and into the next decade – does not take into account the following three additional factors in respect to alternative legal service providers (ALSPs):[171]

• Many legal commentators have projected a linear development when, quite arguably, it is more likely to be exponential. Today’s approximately 1% market share for ALSPs represents the bottom of the S-curve. Money, looking for returns, has discovered the legal market and made its first killings. That sight attracts more money. And all that capital will get better and better at finding profitable revenue within legal services. Growth in some jurisdictions could reach the 50% per annum range. The “math” – if in fact applicable – “quickly becomes scary”.
• Similarly, many legal commentators have not accounted for the displacement effect of revenue earned by the ALSPs. Law firms in the aggregate have been growing revenue at around 2% to 3% annually since 2010 (excluding revenue changes from acquisitions and divestitures). If one dollar earned by an alternative provider means a dollar lost to law firms, the rise of the ALSPs would arguably only stop total revenue by traditional law firms from growing in about 10 years. But if a dollar earned by the ALSPs displaces approximately three dollars lost in traditional law firm revenue. If the displacement effect is at a factor of three, then total traditional law firm revenue may stop growing six years from now.
• Finally, there may be a failure to account for the fact that many law firms implode or merge because they don’t make enough money to keep partners happy in these challenging market conditions. The partnership business model of every traditional law firm today – in particular BigLaw – requires growth: stagnation and/or shrinkage “tanks profitability, risking key partner defections”. Of course, traditional law firms can manage small revenue shrinkage from one year to the next if they react early and take action by cutting costs. But an unexpected shortfall of revenue by 3% may translate to a 7-10% shortfall in distributable profit, and depending on leadership and the “culture of the law firm” almost certainly translates in the current environment into the end of that firm. It doesn’t require an enormous revenue decline for “fickle partnerships to bite the dust” as we have seen in 2017 and should continue to see throughout 2018.[172]

It’s a trend that is gaining steam. Besides the firms that have closed their doors many of the firms that have merged out of existence needed to find a buyer or they may have suffered a similar fate. Rising costs with flat demand is not a good recipe.

– Jeff Balrow, Nimble Services LLC[173]

Why then, does the traditional law firm continue on its course, with only minor variations, ‘kicking and screaming’. Why won’t most traditional law firms retrofit their business model? One, the need to discuss problems that are complicated and sensitive is sometimes overlooked. Two, most law firms have not rethought their underlying business model or operation model because, until recently, technology in law has been a search for greater efficiencies based on the same underlying model of practice. Three, Everyone rationalizes: “there exists an economic conflict between aging equity partners ‘running the table’ and the next generation that is beginning to appreciate its vulnerability. Translation: don’t expect the old guard at law firms to morph into innovators, especially where to do so would require them to be the largest investors in a model with no residual equity”.[174]

Law firms that will thrive in the next decade must revisit their business and delivery model, set a coherent vision, and place culture at the top of the priority list – and managing its “me-first partnership” senior lawyers and rainmakers is a great place to start. A strong vision will go south very quickly if the leadership of BigLaw and traditional law firms do not implement a bold business model and business leadership structure, and thoughtfully create the appropriate culture and actively manage that culture every day.

Corporate culture is the pervasive values, beliefs and attitudes that characterise a company [law firm] and guide its practices.

– Global leadership forum: acting on culture before it eats strategy[175]

Traditional Law Firm Business Model: The Problem, Corporate Business Practices, and A New Business Model Proposal

(a) The Problem

The law firm partnership model is a poor institutional choice for the business of law and the delivery of legal services in today’s legal market.[176] The antiquated rules prescribing who can deliver legal services (lawyers) and the acceptable business structures (the partnership ‘ownership and control’ model) were put in place in a different era, at a different time and under different circumstances.^[177] Its structure today fails to serve virtually all of its stakeholders and – in light of the collapse and mergers of numerous long standing partnerships across the globe – that includes the law firm itself.[178]

Although the traditional law firm partnership model historically worked well,[179] it is now widely acknowledged that dissatisfaction with this business model is not only increasing, but seems to be increasing exponentially: “Law firms are seen to be overpriced, difficult to access, non-transparent, slow, outdated and bloated – providing a 19th century service to 21st century customers”.[180] However, “many in the corporate” BigLaw “legal market continue to be in denial”,[181] blithely maintaining the traditional law firm business model of equity partners sitting on top of a pyramid of non-equity partners and associates who ‘stoke’ profit-per-partner (“PPP” the ‘holy grail of legal metrics’) by billing as many hours as possible at ever-escalating rates, and leveraging (i.e. taking a ‘taste’ of) every billed hour:[182]

“Optimization of PPP now comes at a steep cost. Today’s ever-shrinking cadre of equity partners sustain PPP by pursuing a “future is now” strategy that often involves ‘pruning the herd’ of upcoming talent and service partners. This short-term, ‘run the table until retirement’ strategy serves equity partners well by propping up PPP, but it does not benefit clients or the firm. It casts doubt on the sustainability of all but a few brand differentiated law firms by undermining firm continuity and succession. …

Most firms also have a generational divide whose fault lines are created by PPP. Older partners typically favor stasis in firm structure to preserve PPP. As Richard Susskind quipped: ‘It’s hard to convince a room full of millionaires that they’ve got their business model wrong.’ Younger partners seldom have a meaningful say in the firm’s direction.”

Law firms have managed to maintain profits per equity partner and increase billing rates, but they shouldn’t be complacent. Those achievements could be masking weaknesses and preventing law firm leaders from adapting to new challenges, according to the 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market. … The challenges include flat demand for law firm services, flat to declining profit margins, weakening collections, falling productivity, and loss of market share to alternative legal service providers and others.

– Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA Journal[183]

The up and coming next generation of lawyers are feeling they are fighting the good fight on behalf of the law firm’s long term interests with one hand tied behind their back, held back by the old guard “me-first partners” and inadequate law firm leadership teams who are out of their depth.

The prime directive of the managing partner for most traditional law firms is to keep the firm solvent and intact. That limits their leverage to implement changes that senior partners resist. Successful partners need someone to handle the administrative side of the law firm business, but, as “autonomy-seeking missiles” they do not like to be managed.[184]

However, governance today is more than just writing a good partnership agreement and appointing a managing partner in an “often ill-defined role” following a leadership structure and generic partnership leadership format from the last century.[185]

Stress cracks in the traditional law firm structure- and the reluctance of most managing partners to do anything about it- presage a market void that will be filled by new client-centric, efficient, cost-effective, and transparent models. Translation: there are options to the traditional partnership model.

– Mark Cohen, Law’s Distribution and Price Problems[186]

The law firm partnership model is not a business structure best suited to embracing innovation, and “is one of the worst for embracing change simply because it is so difficult to get consensus among the owners” – the partners – “of the business”.[187]  The outdated partnership model encourages partner “me-first” self-interest (short-term performance over long-term value), and usually exhibit such inherent weaknesses as slow incremental committee decision-making, thin management experience, easy dissolution, and short-term planning:[188]

• A law firm partnership is proprietary. Partners consider themselves first and foremost as proprietors of “banks of clients” and “books of business”. Their loyalty and commitment to the law firm is usually only as good as the law firm is able to sustain an environment for them that’s conducive to maximization of billings. Too many law firms are still wedded to cost-plus, time-based, input-driven billing: there is not enough momentum towards creating value for clients and charging accordingly.
• Partners underinvest in law firms. Usually a partner’s primary interest is to draw down the maximum allowable amount of income on the monthly basis that’s been apportioned to them by the firm Partnership. The traditional law firm may be seen as “a shell like umbrella” that is used to market their expertise and manage their client services. The law firm partnership model provides little incentive to forego distributions and invest in technology or other long-term solutions to better serve the law firm’s or other partners’ clients or potential clients.
• The annual Law Firms in Transition Survey (of 2015, 2016, and 2017) has consistently confirmed that law firm leaders believe that the pace of change within the profession is increasing. However, leadership cited “partner resistance” as one of the reasons for their firms not doing more to change their practices in order to compete (i.e. “still many partners resist change in all its forms”).
• Law firm capital accounts hold the firm’s working capital. If, or when, the ‘rainmaker’ partners leave, they can take their clients with them, and – even more perilous to the traditional law firm – withdraw their capital contributions. Such an exodus of capital and the partner’s associated cash flow, as well as the related problem of the firm sometimes replacing that missing capital by excessive leveraging, has resulted in a number of law firms collapsing.
• Law firm partners have long resisted the notion that they need a strategy. Not surprisingly, many traditional law firms and their leadership are unable to achieve a consensus and make timely decisions on matters of firm strategy, policy, or management.
• This is the “war that’s been raging within law firms”, the fight for control of the business between individual partners and the law firm leadership, with the law firm looking “long term” and the partner level lawyer looking “short term” and with a “me-first” self-interest. Accordingly, most traditional law firms are unable to be truly strategic in their thinking and planning, unable to build a “war chest” (to invest in long term solutions), and unable to seriously invest, attract and retain a true professional management team for the benefit of the overall law firm organization.

Lawyers face challenges at two levels. On the macro level, we are competing with emerging technology, new market entrants, and new models of service delivery. On the firm level, partners compete with one another for origination credit while associates compete for billable work with preferred partners, often to the detriment of the collective endeavor.

– Jennifer Leonard, Law Practice Today[189]

(b) Corporate Business Practices

To be successful in the ‘new normal’, law firm leadership must overcome the ‘partnership drag’[190] of the law firm business model, such that partners undermining the survival or long term success of the law firm are not allowed to ‘dictate the firm’s strategy and direction’, or lack thereof.  To compete, traditional law firms must “become commercial enterprises as well as professional service shops”, instituting business processes and leveraging technology. Without access to ABSs, in recent years BigLaw and larger traditional law firms in North America have been forced to “mimic” – as best they can – a corporate hierarchy and business discipline “better adapted for the overall survival of the business” than the traditional law firm model.[191]

Dealing with leadership is a very emotional issue for most law firms due to the independent nature of most lawyers, and the general unwillingness of partners to put aside their personal interests for the good of the overall firm. The culture of the legal profession stresses individualism and independence and appears in many cases to be antithetical to basic leadership concepts. Lawyers are trained under a paradigm that is foreign to effective leadership – conditioned to be aggressive, combative, and independent, and that lawyers only win or lose. A “me-first” attitude rather than “firm first/client first” attitude. Many lawyers hoard clients and consider them “their clients” as opposed to “firm clients”.[192] Not surprisingly, 93% of AmLaw 100 firms report having experienced bullying, lack of respect, and a “me-first” personal agenda among their ranks.[193]

‘Financial suicide’ …. the scorched earth legal battle over the Cellino and Barnes law firm [57 attorneys and 165 staff] has escalated … ‘I will burn the place to the ground’.

– Ross Cellino, Partner[194]

Managing firms in this environment is not an easy task, and capitalizing on strengths is vital. Fortunately, more firms – in particular forward looking national and international BigLaw firms who are now seeing the writing on the wall – are taking a more holistic corporate approach to talent management, recognizing that running today’s law firms requires not only legal talent but also business management talent: [195]

“Managing partners are increasingly looking to business professionals to run firm operations, the good ones relying on experienced professionals in finance, strategy, business development, marketing, technology, cyber security, pricing, knowledge management and talent. That also includes recruiting, developing and retaining personnel at every level, from lateral partners to office clerks. This emphasis on efficient operations applies not only to the support side of the house, but also to practice groups, many of which are now running as business lines across geographies, both domestic and international, on a profit and loss basis.”

Focus on the basic blocking and tackling of managing your law firm as a business. In too many firms the demands of big rainmakers and big personalities take precedence over sound business principles and even above client needs.  In firms truly governed by business principles, clients and client satisfaction will be paramount.

– James Wilber, Principal, Altman Weil[196]

The laws of economics apply equally to law firms as to other businesses.  Faced with declining demand and competitive alternative legal service providers, traditional law firms are experiencing unprecedented downward price pressure and clients are aggressively seeking even more alternative legal service provider substitutes[197] – utilizing the internet to look beyond jurisdictional borders. It is clear that technology and the accelerated globalization of legal services by ABSs (in countries like the UK and Australia) is decreasing the relevance of geographical boundaries.[198]  Online ABS marketplaces[199] of this sort bring into play a whole different set of buying options for corporate and retail consumers of legal services.

Accordingly, although the legal profession’s regulators in Canada and the U.S. refuse to remove their “lawyer only” monopoly, law firms in these jurisdictions must still address the threat of competition from UK and Australian ABSs – with internet based business models – entering their well-protected markets.[200]

Law firms “are not mere factories, churning out countless replicas of a popular product.  Nor are they think tanks focused on producing thought leadership for academics to ponder.  But law firms are somewhere on that continuum, subject to market forces, facing changing client needs, price pressure from entrenched competitors, and constant innovation from new entrants”.[201] Both “businesses and private individuals are increasingly willing to use the legal services of firms other than traditional law firms. More than half of all in-house legal departments now consider buying legal services from online providers such as LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer and LawDepot”.[202]

It is an industry that is in desperate need of disruption. It is very traditional, extremely inflexible and ridiculously expensive.

– Dan Fox, Johnson Hana International, Dublin headquartered alternative legal solutions company[203]

(c)  A Proposed New Business Model for Law Firms

As such, in light of the outdated law firm partnership model, there are many good reasons for law firms to adopt appropriate corporate business practices.  Law firms that want to flourish in the world ahead must adapt:[204]

• Changing the way traditional law firms approach client service is at the heart of the matter. The traditional law firm’s “lawyer only” business model is too narrow, inadequately client-focused, and too expensive. Any new business model should be based on client-centered considerations (‘what is at stake?’ and ‘what are the client’s objectives?’), and the identification of the optimalway to achieve the client’s objectives, in light of the stakes involved. While maintaining the traditional commitment to quality, outcomes, and ethics, the new business model should be equally determined to achieve these objectives using the optimal set of resources (maximize efficiency) and proceeding in the most cost-effective way (minimize costs).[205] The right resources (lawyer or otherwise), doing the right work, in the most cost effective and efficient manner.
• To enable an optimized new business model, law firms will need to:[206]
  • diversify their resource and internal leadership/management model to include a different mix of people, more technology and more collaboration with non-lawyers.
  • move to a financial model which is based on the value of the services provided (i.e. “outputs”), which incentivizes processes and norms that manage costs to their optimal level, and which manages revenue in a way that generates a sustainable level of profit. (Note: avoid “inputs” such as the billable hour[207] which incentivizes inefficiency and unnecessary cost, and obscures the true financial elements of a law firm’s operations).
  • embrace the need to continually innovate in the way they deliver legal services by adopting a model of annual investment in research and development for the future (i.e. new ideas (i.e. business models), processes, technologies, and resources).

According to some industry observers, we are witnessing an ongoing paradigm shift from BigLaw to what is being dubbed NewLaw.

– Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size[208]

The forecast is that the traditional pyramid-shaped structure of law firms – with partners sitting above a large number of associates and articling students / trainees – will be replaced by a diamond-shaped structure and enhanced leadership and operational flexibility – with business professionals and law partners at the top, but the core formed of managers, AI/IT support, data analysis, process and design analysis, business development and brand developers, pricing, etc.[209] If correct, this type of new law firm business model will therefore consist of a smaller percentage of law partner and on-track-to-partner-level lawyers, and an increased percentage of career associates, flex-time lawyers, and non-lawyers such as “legal service professionals” (i.e. paralegals). The “legal service professionals” can perform elements of the engagement that are not themselves involving high end legal judgment, as well as managing critical planning, project management, technology and R&D functions. This business model contemplates active collaboration with non-lawyer third parties and professionals who can provide resources and service at the requisite quality levels more efficiently than the law firm can on its own. Examples include legal process outsourcers, staffing firms, data analytics providers,[210] and various business professionals.

Clearly one of the trends starting to develop now is that “law firms are basically made up of very junior lawyers and partners, with “virtually nothing in between”.[211] Not surprisingly, “this will force a change of culture in law firms”, who will have to prioritise the recruitment of non-legal staff.[212]

In this environment, ABSs are an important tool for law firms to be competitive and thrive.[213] The flexibility of the ABS provide firms with greater access to the capital markets as well as flexibility of funds (enhanced financial flexibility) and management structures (enhanced operational flexibility). By loosening the rules on legal services delivery and permitted business structures, regulators in Canada and the U.S. can encourage more innovation and business process improvement,^[214] including increased investment in technology and knowledge management systems, and strategic partnering of lawyers with other professionals (i.e. accountants), including business professionals and technology experts (IT engineers, design thinkers, law technologists, law data scientists).^[215]

One of the main challenges of technology and innovation is how to fund its investment, particularly within the partnership model.

– BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017[216]

As I noted in a recent article,[217] until relatively recently, throughout the world, legal services have by law only been delivered to the consumer by traditional law firms that are wholly owned and controlled by lawyers (the law firm partnership model[218] ). With the goal of modernizing the delivery of legal services and encouraging competition and spurring innovation, countries such as the UK and Australia have dropped the “lawyer only” prohibition, proactively initiating regulations allowing – among other things – traditional law firms the option and flexibility of adopting and operating under an alternative business structure (ABS) if they strategically determined that doing so would be beneficial to their competitive and business position in the legal market.

However, in jurisdictions such as the U.S. and Canada, the legal profession and its self-regulators have continued to maintain opposition to ABSs and non-lawyer ownership and investment[219]  –  even as Bar Associations and legal commentators have recommended “scrapping the current regime that prohibits non-lawyer ownership of law firms”,[220] noting that:[221]

“Law is both profession and business … an enormous global business – approximately $1Trillion. Legal practice is no longer synonymous with the business of delivering legal services, and law firms have been slow to adapt their delivery methods and implement new tools in recognition of that distinction. …

[In Canada and the U.S.] why not separate regulation of the practice of law from the business of law? This is precisely the legislative counterpoise at work in the UK where The Law Society governs practice issue and the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA) determines permissible business and delivery structures for legal services. …

Law is moving from a labor-intensive industry where only lawyers perform all ‘legal’ work to a digitized paradigm where legal expertise is leveraged by technology and process to provide ‘faster, better, cheaper’ solutions. In the digital legal marketplace, lawyers work side-by side with other professionals, paraprofessionals, and machines.”

The Canadian Bar Association has added its voice to the ABS debate, recommending to the profession and its self-regulators that “lawyers should be allowed to practice in business structures that permit fee-sharing, multidisciplinary practice, and ownership, management, and investment by persons other than lawyers or other regulated legal professionals”.[222] The legal profession’s rules prohibiting ABSs in Canada and the U.S. are archaic and may even hurt the sustainable long term success of law firms in these jurisdictions in today’s legal market: law firms and non-lawyer innovators should be permitted the opportunity to offer the retail and corporate legal consumer innovative, competitive, accessible, and affordable “regulated” legal services through the vehicle of ABSs – in line with the UK and Australian experience.[223]  Across the globe, there are strong reasons in favour of ABSs (or similar corporate vehicles) to support the continued success and sustainability of traditional law firms, chief among them:[224]

1. Enhanced financial flexibility: Equity can be raised from a broader base, including outside of the legal sector. ABSs offer significant and needed financial flexibility, including asset protection, greater flexibility for raising and retaining capital, greater flexibility for remunerating non-lawyer professionals and employees (more equal reward to attract and retain the appropriate talent), possible tax advantages, and opportunities to introduce more effective management and decision-making arrangements. The traditional financial model is more limited. Permitting non-lawyer investment (including equity financing)[225] would also help smaller law firms, sole practitioners, and newer lawyers afford to, for example, partner with skilled information technology professionals to develop innovative ways to deliver legal services.
2. Enhanced operational flexibility: ABSs offer firms flexibility in how they structure and run their business. ABSs allow firms to strengthen their management teams through the increased use of non-lawyer business professionals. Although some BigLaw and larger traditional law firms employ some non-lawyer business professionals in some operational roles,[226] it would stimulate better management for all firms (small, medium or large) to have the ability to attract and retain a broader range of business executives and/or managers if there was an option to offer a share of the firm’s ownership (or other more equal reward). Non-lawyer business professionals can offer law firms distinct insight that can improve the delivery of legal services to their clients.
3. Increased cost effectiveness and quality of services: ABSs in the form of multidisciplinary practices offer benefits to both law firms and consumers. The “major benefit of multidisciplinary services is the delivery of an integrated team approach to serving client interests – providing clients with a ‘one-stop shopping’ approach for problems requiring services in different fields.” This results in an “efficiency that translates into savings of time or money, and ensures the delivery of a higher quality product to the client with lower transaction costs.”

The biggest push has been outside the U.S. to date. But there are many observers who think that the moat that the U.S. legal industry has built around itself isn’t impenetrable, and that corporations with real money will begin voting with their dollars for a new regime.

– David Curle, Why Size Matters: Big Four Accounting Firms Poised to Move In[227]

At this point it is clear that the traditional law firm partnership model is not an effective or efficient management structure.[228] The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence – it is to act with yesterday’s logic.[229] Management consultant Peter Drucker famously asked the then newly installed GE CEO Jack Welch a simple question: “If you weren’t already in this business, would you enter it today? And if the answer is no, what are you going to do about it?”[230] The question is particularly relevant to traditional law firms and their leadership teams as legal consumers engage in the current “paradigm shift” in the delivery and perceived value of corporate legal services,[231] and General Counsel and their organizations are increasingly willing to procure services from legal service providers with business and delivery models different than the traditional law firm partnership model.[232]

In this environment, law firms must be “bold, innovative and willing to adapt” – re-examining their business and delivery models, requirement for professional leadership and business discipline, and envisioning a law firm that is not “business as usual”.[233]  Effective law firm leaders will need to position their law firm to implement the following:[234]

• A shared vision[235] for the firm.
• A clearly defined business strategy[236] – ensure their firms have a clearly defined business strategy that is compelling, credible, and conveys a competitive advantage.[237] This strategy must be articulated, internally and externally, with passion and energy. For most traditional law firms this will likely require a two-pronged strategy: (a) change the traditional business and operating model and invest in enabling technology; and (b) reposition to adapt to the challenges of alternative legal service providers, new technologies, and new or underserved markets.
• A business model that supports the business strategy – adopt the right governance structure, see that it operates with integrity at all levels throughout the organization and ensure that the right behaviour is measured and rewarded.
• Investment in business systems that support the business model – ensure that every investment decision is well-informed, evidence-based and supports the firm’s business model.
• An organizational culture[238] – create a powerful message of unity and purpose, put culture and shared values at the heart of everything the firm does, and empower everyone to do the right thing in any given situation (i.e. support experimentation/exploration/innovation). Leadership plays a significant role in the development of their firm’s brand and tone of voice to make sure it aligns with long term sustainable growth, and the type of lawyers (employees) and clients the firm wishes to attract.
• Alignment of partners and lawyers with the business strategy (emphasizing accountability) – to be successful, leadership must build a law firm that is simultaneously purpose-driven, performance-focused (i.e. Key Performance Indicators),[239] and principles-led.[240] Each lawyer and employee must understand their role in support of the strategy, be empowered to do what is right, and provided the management information to enable them to measure and monitor their own performance. Everyone must be held accountable to the long term business strategy and annual goals. Particularly important, the partner, associate, and overall employee compensation program must be aligned to ensure the “right behaviours are rewarded and that bad behaviours are discouraged”.

Considering all the ways in which innovation and legal technology infrastructure is shaping the practice of law – making lawyers more nimble, more efficient, and more secure – the law firms that survive and thrive will be the ones that are positioned with a vision, strategy, and appropriate business model to invest in and leverage the most advanced capabilities available. This will make the forward looking law firms more competitive and less likely to be left behind, positioned to leverage and accelerate forward.[241]

New business models must be supported with new capabilities, approaches, and organizational structures.

– New Business Models for a New Global Landscape[242]

Conclusion

The legal profession is in a period of major change. Once insulated, law has become one of the most competitive markets in the new normal.[243] As the legal services delivery model and legal market evolves nationally and across the globe there are significant implications for how the traditional law firm will need to adapt and structure its business model to remain competitive and maximize opportunity.

The market for law firm services is being transformed — by clients, by law firms that ‘get it,’ and by alternative service providers — and that pace of change in this transformative process is accelerating.

– 2018 Georgetown Report on the State of the Legal Market[244]

Across the world, legal and non-legal NewLaw alternative legal service providers are lighting the path – if not proving – that the BigLaw and traditional law firms must “evolve”, and that “a new blend of business cleverness and legal minds” is required to “usurp” the law firm business model: “the traditional partnership, culture, and economics.”[245]  The status quo is unsustainable[246] – “only those firms that get out of their own way and retool with speed in the very near future will be vital, vibrant, and solvent in the years to come”.[247]

The key to establishing a viable, competitive, and relevant law firm is innovation and leadership— not just the development and adoption of technology-driven platforms and service delivery models, although they are critical, but through new ideas about how law firms and their business models are structured (and how they are regulated to maintain professional standards while protecting the public).[248]

The biggest changes will be about bar rules and the nature of partnerships. The current models prevent us from operating more efficient businesses: the short term, capital out each year model, with hierarchy, status and egos.

– law firm leader, BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017[249]

Technology is redefining what it means to be a lawyer and transforming law from a labour-intensive service industry into a technology and process-enabled one.[250] A law firm business model, “to be successful”, will require working with an ecosystem of legal and non-legal partners to create best-in-class offerings, and take advantage of technology developments that make it more efficient and less expensive to reach legal consumers and provide services – which in turn will increase demand for those legal services. Such a model must be supported by new capabilities, processes, and most importantly organizational structures.[251]

Is the world evolving faster than BigLaw and the traditional law firm can keep up with?[252] It remains to be seen precisely how the legal profession will look in the years that lie ahead. However, whatever the future may bring, neither lawyers nor the legal profession can afford to be complacent as further consolidation and law firm dissolutions continue in the wake of the weaker BigLaw and traditional law firms continuing to lose their ability to compete.[253]

Those [Law] firms that are able to adjust to the new market realities, not by putting band-aids on the old models, but rather by engaging in a thoughtful review and (where necessary) redesign of their approaches to client service, pricing, legal work processes, talent management, and overall structure will enjoy an enormous competitive advantage. Those that do not will face an increasingly uncertain future.

– 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Market[254]

The success of the legal profession will depend on an openness to change, new law firm business models and alternative business structures, strong leadership, and a willingness to embrace the challenges and opportunities afforded by new and emerging technologies and methods of working. Above all, it will depend on the profession’s capacity to adapt.[255]

Eric Sigurdson

 

Endnotes:

[1] Legal services are essentially delivered to consumers today as they have been for the last Century – by lawyers (with limited exceptions for other licensed legal professionals such as paralegals), and then only through specific types of organizations that are owned and controlled by lawyers. In short, generally only licensed lawyers – in sole practice or in firms owned and controlled by lawyers – may provide legal services. These organizational forms or business structures are based on the “law firm partnership model” and may include general partnerships, limited liability partnerships, professional corporations, or limited liability companies. [see, Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017; Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013]

[2] Stephen Mayson, Law firm partnership: the Grand Delusion, Stephen Mayson.com, October 9, 2012.

[3] BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017, New Law Firm Structures and Models, BDO, September 2017.

[4] Ken Grady, My Thoughts On 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market, The Algorithmic Society, January 11, 2018. See, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’).

[5] Eric Sigurdson, In-house Staff Counsel Operations: alternative legal services delivery model employs ‘first class lawyers’ to effectively handle litigation in the new normal, Sigurdson Post,

[6] Mark Cohen, Differentiation in the New Legal Marketplace and Why it Matters, Forbes, January 2, 2018.

[7] Mark Cohen, Differentiation in the New Legal Marketplace and Why it Matters, Forbes, January 2, 2018.

[8] 2018 Industry Outlook, Major, Lindsey & Africa, 2017. Also see, Eric Sigurdson, General Counsel, Chief Legal Officers & In-House Counsel: Five New Year’s Resolutions – Leadership, Operations, Metrics, Technology, and External Counsel, Sigurdson Post, December 13, 2016.

[9] 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’); Legal Executive Institute, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market: Transformation of Legal Services Market is Accelerating – Are Law Firms Ready?, Legal Executive Institute.com (Thomson Reuters), January 10, 2018.

[10] A platform for change: Dentons global chief innovation officer John Fernandez on his new role, Legal Technology.com, January 4, 2018.

[11] Ken Grady, My Thoughts On 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market, The Algorithmic Society, January 11, 2018.

[12] Weaker law firms unable to compete will lead to market consolidation, Global Legal Post, January 2, 2018.

[13] Ron Friedman, 2018 Prediction – Lawyers Must Change How They Work, Prism Legal, January 2, 2018; 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’); Legal Executive Institute, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market: Transformation of Legal Services Market is Accelerating – Are Law Firms Ready?, Legal Executive Institute.com (Thomson Reuters), January 10, 2018; Ken Grady, My Thoughts On 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market, The Algorithmic Society, January 11, 2018; Roy Strom, New Report Warns of a ‘Wake-Up Call’ for Stagnant Law Firms, American Lawyer January 11, 2018; Pam Woldow, Lower Revenue? Lower Utilization? Watch Out BigLaw – You Might Be Doing Something Right, LinkedIn, December 27, 2017:

“The erosion of overall demand for legal services has been well documented. It’s not a temporary blip; it’s a trend.  The 2017 Law Firms in Transition, An Altman Weil Flash Survey calls the decrease in demand “a disease.” And at first glance, this trend may indeed look like an illness; after all, in most firms decreased demand means decreased revenue, right? Well, that can’t be good. The symptoms of the “ailment” are common and evident:

• Companies are pulling more and more work in-house.
• Work is being shifted from law firms to alternative legal service providers/LPOs.
• Companies are no longer contracting for work considered non-essential to their business/strategy.
• Manually intensive work is being completed utilizing technology, with less human involvement.”

[14] 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’); Legal Executive Institute, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market: Transformation of Legal Services Market is Accelerating – Are Law Firms Ready?, Legal Executive Institute.com (Thomson Reuters), January 10, 2018; Debra Cassens Weiss, Declining productivity costs law firms an average of more than $74K per lawyer, report says, ABA Journal, January 12, 2018.

[15] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international].

[16] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017; Weaker law firms unable to compete will lead to market consolidation, Global Legal Post, January 2, 2018.

[17] Elizabeth Olson, 2017 Record Year for Law Firm Mergers, BigLaw Business.com, January 3, 2018.

[18] For example, see Anndam Bhattacharya, Martin Reeves, Nilolaus Lang, Rajah Augustinraj, New Business Models for a New Global Landscape, BCG Henderson Institute, November 14, 2017.

[19] BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017, New Law Firm Structures and Models, BDO, September 2017.

[20] Legal services are essentially delivered to consumers today as they have been for the last Century – by lawyers (with limited exceptions for other licensed legal professionals such as paralegals), and then only through specific types of organizations that are owned and controlled by lawyers. In short, generally only licensed lawyers – in sole practice or in firms owned and controlled by lawyers – may provide legal services. These organizational forms or business structures are based on the “law firm partnership model” and may include general partnerships, limited liability partnerships, professional corporations, or limited liability companies. [see, Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017; Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013]

[21] Patrick Dransfield, The new spectrum of legal services, LinkedIn, October 20, 2016.

[22] Ken Grady, We Need to Understand the Rules to Play the Game, Algorithmic Society, September 24, 2017.

[23] Sandra Rubin, Funding Legal Innovation in Canada, Lexpert.ca, June 27, 2016.

[24] Jordan Furlong, 9 Emerging Truths about Legal Service Delivery, CBA.org, Spring 2016.

[25] NewLaw was devised as a term in 2013 by consultant Eric Chin. NewLaw has been defined as “any model, process, or tool that represents a significantly different approach to the creation or provision of legal services than what the legal profession traditionally has employed”. For example, NewLaw ‘alternative legal service provider’ models may include secondment firms, law and business advice companies (i.e. Big Four multidisciplinary accounting firms), law firm accordion companies, virtual online legal models (law firms and companies), in-house legal departments, and innovative law firms and companies. See, Ilina Rejeva, What is NewLaw and How It is Changing the Legal Industry Forever, LegalTrek, April 26, 2016; Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 2), Spend Matters.com, November 14, 2017:

“The term NewLaw was reportedly coined in 2013 by legal industry strategy and M&A consultant Eric Chin, when he and his team began analyzing  what was then already called “alternative legal service providers” (now abbreviated ALSPs) that were emerging at the periphery of the legal industry. In 2014, legal market analyst and consultant Jordan Furlong defined NewLaw as “any model, process or tool that represents a significantly different approach to the creation or provision of legal services than what the legal profession traditionally has employed.” While NewLaw is a broad paradigm encompassing innovative and often technology-enabled business and operating models (even as adaptations/extensions at BigLaw firms), ALSPs may be the most important manifestation from a legal services procurement perspective.

At this stage of the game ALSPs come in many forms. Thomson Reuters’ recent study “Alternative Legal Service Providers: Understanding the Growth and Benefits of These New Legal Providers” breaks ALSPs down into these categories: [Accounting and Audit Firms; Captive LPOs (Legal Process Outsourcers); Independent LPOs, e-discovery, and Document Review Service Providers; Managed Legal Services; Contract Lawyers, in-sourcing, and Staffing Services] –

From a procurement perspective, we would probably take issue with some of these categories. For example, the lumping together of independent LPOs, e-discovery and document review service providers and the isolation of captive LPOs seems unhelpful. Captive LPOs represent less than 2% of estimated total ALSP revenues, while independent LPOs, e-discovery and document review service providers as an aggregate category makes up almost 75% (and in all likelihood Independent LPOs account for a large majority of those revenues). Moreover, the remaining types of ALSPs in this category are numerous, diverse and growing (e-discovery and document review service providers are not the only ones).

One other type of alternative for procuring legal services–not mentioned above– is what we might call an online marketplace or network of vetted legal firms. Globality, for example, provides legal services buyers with network of highly vetted, sometimes specialized small to mid-sized firms operating across the globe in many different legal jurisdictions. Online marketplaces of this sort bring into play a whole different set of buying options.

Indeed, the evolution from BigLaw to NewLaw means a proliferation of many entirely new legal services providers that generally incorporate new technologies into their operating and business models.”

[26] Stuart Barr, What will the law firms of the future look like?, HighQ.com, November 9, 2016.

[27] Joshua Lenon and Bryce Tarling, The Next Phase of Legal Technology Has Already Been Built, Above the Law, December 7, 2017.

[28] For example, see: Law.com Editors, 7 Law Firms That Moved the Needle on Innovation in 2017, Law.com, January 2, 2018; Patrick Dransfield, The new spectrum of legal services, LinkedIn, October 20, 2016.

[29] Lucy Endel Bassli, Process is Not a Four-Letter Word, Legal Business World, January 5, 2018.

[30] For example, see: Erin Winick, Lawyer-Bots Are Shaking Up Jobs, Technology Review, December 12, 2017:

“Meticulous research, deep study of case law, and intricate argument-building—lawyers have used similar methods to ply their trade for hundreds of years. But they’d better watch out, because artificial intelligence is moving in on the field.

As of 2016, there were over 1,300,000 licensed lawyers and 200,000 paralegals in the U.S. Consultancy group McKinsey estimates that 22 percent of a lawyer’s job and 35 percent of a law clerk’s job can be automated, which means that while humanity won’t be completely overtaken, major businesses and career adjustments aren’t far off (see “Is Technology About to Decimate White-Collar Work?”). In some cases, they’re already here. …

So far, AI-powered document discovery tools have had the biggest impact on the field. By training on millions of existing documents, case files, and legal briefs, a machine-learning algorithm can learn to flag the appropriate sources a lawyer needs to craft a case, often more successfully than humans. For example, JPMorgan announced earlier this year that it is using software called Contract Intelligence, or COIN, which can in seconds perform document review tasks that took legal aides 360,000 hours.”

[31] Dan Storbeaek, Trends in Legal Tech 2018, SecurePrivacy.AI/LegalTechTrends, powerpoint presentation, November 22, 2017; Dan Storbaek, What can Law Firms do to get ahead on Legal Tech, Linkedin.com, November 24, 2017.

[32] Jordan Furlong, We’re here for a good time, not a long time, Law21, January 12, 2018. Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017:

“The Georgetown data confirms that the traditional law firm model no longer dominates the legal marketplace, nor does it align well with its direction. This begs the question: ‘why don’t firms retrofit their model?’ Simple answer: there exists an economic conflict between aging equity partners ‘running the table’ and the next generation that is beginning to appreciate its vulnerability. Translation: don’t expect the old guard at law firms to morph into innovators, especially where to do so would require them to be the largest investors in a model with no residual equity. The absence of real residual equity value at law firms is yet another nail in its coffin. Contrast this, for example, with senior in-house counsel that have a very significant financial interest in the long-term success of the enterprise—even after they retire.”

[33] Ralph Baxter, Looking at the Law Firm Partnership Model and How to Fix it, Thomson Reuters, February 25, 2015; Professor Johnathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to Law Firm Short-Termism, Southern California Law Review 2015; William D. Henderson, More Complex than Greed, The American Lawyer (AxiomLaw.com), May 29, 2012; John Kelly, Partnership Impediment to Innovation in Law “The PIIL Factor” A Future Law Perspective, Linkedin.com May 19, 2015; Jordan Furlong, The lawyer vs. the law firm, CBA National Magazine, Fall 2016; International Bar Association, ‘Times are a-changin’: disruptive innovation and the legal profession, IBA Legal Policy & Research Unit, May 2016; Beverley Spencer, The Innovation Game, CBA National Magazine, Spring 2017, page 30; 2017 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com (“we see firms making only cursory investments where they should be aiming for broader, deeper transformation. And still many partners resist change in all its forms”); 2016 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com; 2015 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com – Law Firms in Transition Survey – the survey was conducted in March and April 2015. It polled managing partners and chairs at 320 US law firms employing 50 or more lawyers, including 47 per cent of the 350 largest law firms in the US: Thomas S Clay and Eric A Seeger, ‘Law Firms in Transition Survey’ (Altman Weil, 2015).

[34] Jordan Furlong, Break the law firm business model, law21.ca, December 19, 2017.

[35] Dr. Irene Boland, Nobody likes change. Three sweet steps to transformational learning, LinkedIn, December 16, 2017.

[36] Roy Strom, New Report Warns of a ‘Wake-Up Call’ for Stagnant Law Firms, American Lawyer January 11, 2018; 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’).

[37] Roy Strom, New Report Warns of a ‘Wake-Up Call’ for Stagnant Law Firms, American Lawyer January 11, 2018; 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’).

[38] Jack Zenger, Change Your Leaders to Change Your Culture, Forbes, November 25, 2017.

[39] Rahul Gupta, Nokia CEO ended his speech saying this “we didn’t do anything wrong, but somehow we lost”, LinkedIn, May 9, 2016.

[40] See, A platform for change: Dentons global chief innovation officer John Fernandez on his new role, Legal Technology.com, January 4, 2018:

“In the main, most firms haven’t innovated their business model and with the advent of new technology, you need to sort that out and look at the entire supply chain and start to apply different pricing and delivery models to each element of the supply chain. As firms continue to build experience and structure their business and engagement with clients, the uptake is going to increase. We’re only early days in fully appreciating the enormous potential for delivering services not just cheaper but better – where machine learning is going to be most impactful.

We have to look at the business model in terms of talent and how we are delivering that talent and pricing that works. I think it would be premature to think of that in terms of changing the partnership model but as we look at how we change the delivery model, there’s going to be implications for how you structure the business to maximise opportunity.”

[41] Tabby Kinder, Boutiques will benefit from Brexit as big firms struggle to future-proof, The Lawyer, February 22, 2017. See, Global Elite Law Firm Brand Index 2017, Acritas.com; Kathryn Rubino, This is the Most Dominant Biglaw Brand in the World (2018), Above the Law, October 10, 2017; Matt Byrne, Clifford Chance gains £15m in savings thanks to tech push, The Lawyer, November 22, 2017; Patrick Dransfield, The law firm of the future and the Ghost of Christmas present, LinkedIn, December 21, 2017 (“top-tier firms such as Clifford Chance and Latham & Watkins are celebrating record-breaking years for both revenue generation and profit-for-partner, while the Georgetown Law Report sounds like a broken record, pronouncing doom and gloom on the legal industry as a whole”). Also see: Isobel Lee, Dentons enters Netherlands through Boekel Merger, Property EU, March 2, 2017; Staci Zaretsky, The Global 100: The Richest Law Firms in the World (2016), Above the Law, September 26, 2016; Debra Cassens Weiss, Latham’s revenue in 2016 is the highest ever for a law firm; equity partner profits top $3M, ABA Journal, February 24, 2017; Chris Johnson, Latham has another Outstanding Year, with Revenue surpassing $2.8B, American Lawyer, February 23, 2017; Anthony Lin, The Rise of the Megafirm, ABA Journal, September 1, 2015. Also see, Eric Sigurdson, The Global Corporate Legal Market: Rise of the Big Four Accounting Firms as an alternative legal services delivery model – from ‘multidisciplinary’ professional service firms to ‘globally integrated’ business solution providers, Sigurdson Post, March 27, 2017.

[42] It is by now common knowledge that corporate clients are increasingly seeking comprehensive or all-inclusive solutions that cost effectively integrate law into a wider category of “business solutions”—indeed, exactly the approach the Big Four exemplify and advocate in the legal market’s new normal. See, David B. Wilkins and Maria Jose Esteban, The Reemergence of the Big Four in Law: their rise, transformation, and potential triumph, The Practice (Vol. 2, Issue 2), Harvard Law School: Center on the Legal Profession (thepractice.law.harvard.edu), January 2016; Eric Sigurdson, The Global Corporate Legal Market: Rise of the Big Four Accounting Firms as an alternative legal services delivery model – from ‘multidisciplinary’ professional service firms to ‘globally integrated’ business solution providers, Sigurdson Post, March 27, 2017: What the law firm model ultimately needs to look like for sustainable success is debateable, however it appears that the elite members of BigLaw are currently taking  steps to look more like the Big Four, possibly at a point in time where their organizational form may not be nearly as well developed:

“Several of the largest and most influential global law firms are now advertising themselves in ways that are indistinguishable from the Big Four’s self-presentation, dramatically underscoring just how much the legal world as a whole has moved to the latter’s terrain.”

[43] Eric Sigurdson, A Way Forward: Disruptive Innovation, the Legal Profession, and the Client – what is appropriate legal services delivery model in the ‘new normal’, Sigurdson Post, November 15, 2016; Mark Cohen, Differentiation in the New Legal Marketplace and Why it Matters, Forbes, January 2, 2018; Bruce MacEwen, Is BigLaw One Business, or Two, Adam Smith Esq.com, December 29, 2017.

[44] Note: Beyond the bunker mentality “lawyer only” monopoly in North America.

[45] Example: pressure on General Counsel/CLO continues to increase as they are called upon to control costs and provide business counsel as part of a company’s or organization’s leadership team; in-house legal departments continue to face pressure to reduce costs – ‘more with less’; other service delivery approaches involving technology, process improvement and knowledge management continue to be developed; Corporate legal departments continue to increase and bring work in-house;  alternative legal service providers continue to increase in number as well as in breadth of services they offer; now also several stand-alone flex-lawyer businesses such as Axiom and Caravel as well as virtual firms such as Taylor English and FisherBroyles; continued growth of technology-powered services that do not require lawyers to deliver them (while lawyers are needed at various stages to help build these services, they are increasingly less needed in many areas to deliver them – RocketLawyer, LegalZoom, DoNotPay); stagnant demand for traditional lawyers; unbundling of legal services, corporate in-housing of legal work, offshore outsourcing, etc.  See for example: Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017; Bob Denney, 2017 What’s Hot and What’s Not in the Legal Profession, Attorney at Work.com, November 27, 2017.

[46] Rahul Gupta, Nokia CEO ended his speech saying this “we didn’t do anything wrong, but somehow we lost”, LinkedIn, May 9, 2016.

[47] Dan Storbeaek, Trends in Legal Tech 2018, SecurePrivacy.AI/LegalTechTrends, powerpoint presentation, November 22, 2017; Dan Storbaek, What can Law Firms do to get ahead on Legal Tech, Linkedin.com, November 24, 2017.

[48] D. Casey Flaherty, Law Firm Partners: If It Ain’t Broke…, 3 Geeks and a Law Firm Blog, July 24, 2016.

[49] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]; Roy Strom, In 2018, Law Firms Will Face Greater Challenges than Slow Growth, The American Lawyer, December 22, 2017; D. Casey Flaherty, Law Firm Partners: If It Ain’t Broke…, 3 Geeks and a Law Firm Blog, July 24, 2016.

[50] Ellen Rosen, Spending in Law Departments is Rising, But the Money Isn’t Going to Law Firms, Big Law Business.com (Bloomberg Law), October 13, 2015;

[51] Elizabeth Olson, Corporate Lawyers Say They Are Spending More In-House, New York Times, January 28, 2016.

[52] The Size of the US Legal Market: Shrinking Piece of a Bigger Pie – an LEI Graphic, Legal Executive Institute, January 11, 2016.

[53] Katie Walsh, Companies want lawyers to kill the billable hour, Financial Review, June 23, 2017. See, Eric Sigurdson, The Global Corporate Legal Market: Rise of the Big Four Accounting Firms as an alternative legal services delivery model – from ‘multidisciplinary’ professional service firms to ‘globally integrated’ business solution providers, Sigurdson Post, March 27, 2017.

[54] John Olmstead, How to Reinvent Your Law Practice in Order to Prosper in the 21^st Century, Olmstead Associates.com, 2010.

[55] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 1), Spend Matters.com, November 13, 2017.

[56] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 2), Spend Matters.com, November 14, 2017:

“While legal advisory services have long been embedded in the Big Four’s tax and audit services, new categories and geographic markets are now being pursued separately and strategically. For example, over the past year or so PwC has built up and added new management to what it now calls its NewLaw practice. The NewLaw practice has been described as an MLS (Managed Legal Services) offering that “covers a broad range of services, including: giving advice on in-house legal function efficiency; contract digitization and the integration of better processes; and the use of legal tech in large contract review projects, which includes using AI applications.”

Earlier this year, PwC acquired a Washington DC-based law firm as a first step in its NewLaw practice US market entry. More recently, the company crossed over into the ALSP category of contract lawyers and staffing services with its flexible legal resources offering — something that now puts PwC NewLaw in competition with legal temp ALSPs like Axiom and Lawyers on Demand (LOD), not just with BigLaw firms. Different providers playing across different categories in the emerging ALSP world seems to be a fact of life. Axiom also plays in the managed legal services space, and Thomson Reuters plays in both managed legal services and several other ALSP categories.”

[57] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017.

[58] David Tal, Forecast: Trends that will reshape the modern law firm – Future of Law P1, Quantum Run.com, August 22, 2016.

[59] Ilina Rejeva, Michael Bradley: Firms Risk Going the Way of Encyclopaedia Britannica, LegalTrek, April 2016.

[60] Joan Williams, Aaron Platt, Jessica Lee, Disruptive Innovation: New Models of Legal Practice, 2015. [http://worklifelaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Disruptive-Innovations-New-Models-of-Legal-Practice-webNEW.pdf]

[61] Patrick Dransfield, The new spectrum of legal services, LinkedIn, October 20, 2016 – citing Richard Susskind.

[62] Kandy Williams, Is the Legal Profession on The Cusp of Uber-Like Disruption? The ABA Commission’s Report on The Future of Legal Services in The U.S, Montage Legal.com, October 25, 2016.

[63] 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’).

[64] 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2017 Georgetown Report’). Also see, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’); Legal Executive Institute, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market: Transformation of Legal Services Market is Accelerating – Are Law Firms Ready?, Legal Executive Institute.com (Thomson Reuters), January 10, 2018.

[65] The Georgetown Report cites, “erosion of the traditional law firm franchise,” a euphemism for “clients no longer need large law firms to handle many legal tasks.”

[66] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017; 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute.

[67] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 1), Spend Matters.com, November 13, 2017; 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute.

[68] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017.

[69] 2018 Industry Outlook, Major, Lindsey & Africa, 2017.

[70] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017.

[71] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 2), Spend Matters.com, November 14, 2017; ALM Intelligence, alm.com, September 2017.

[72] 2018 Industry Outlook, Major, Lindsey & Africa, 2017.

[73] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 1), Spend Matters.com, November 13, 2017; 2017 Legal Procurement Survey, Bloomberg Law and Buying Legal Council, bna.com.

[74] Nick Hilborne, Legal Futures Conference: “Third of top 300 law firms will disappear by 2022”, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 22, 2017.

[75] 2018 Industry Outlook, Major, Lindsey & Africa, 2017; Elizabeth Olson, 2017 Record Year for Law Firm Mergers, BigLaw Business.com, January 3, 2018;

[76] Christine Simmons, Dozens of Law Firms Called it Quits in 2017, New York Law Journal, December 19, 2017; Elizabeth Olson, 2017 Record Year for Law Firm Mergers, BigLaw Business.com, January 3, 2018 (“the law firm merger market is white hot”); The year in perspective: Disappearing law firm brands in 2017, Global Legal Post, December 22, 2017; Cliff Roitelle, Law Firm In Trouble, LinkedIn, November 22, 2017 (“ Sedgwick LLP joins Heller, Thacher Proffit & Wood, Thelen, Dewey, Howrey and other AM Law 100 & 200 firms, and will be closing its doors at year-end.”); Roy Strom, As More Partners Depart, Sedgwick Confirms Plans to Close, The American Lawyer, November 27, 2017; Sedgwick to shut up shop after 85 years, Global Legal Post, November 23, 2017; Heather Suttie, Legal Markets and Marketing: 10 Trends to Watch and Watch Out for in 2018, Heather Suttie.ca, January 14, 2018.

[77] Nick Hilborne, Legal Futures Conference: “Third of top 300 law firms will disappear by 2022”, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 22, 2017.

[78] Nick Hilborne, Legal Futures Conference: “Third of top 300 law firms will disappear by 2022”, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 22, 2017.

[79] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 2), Spend Matters.com, November 14, 2017.

[80] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 1), Spend Matters.com, November 13, 2017.

[81] Amanda Griffin, Corporate Consumers Turn to Alternative Providers, JD Journal.com, November 21, 2017; 2017 State of the Industry Survey, Corporate Legal Operations Consortium, November 2017

[82] Mallory Hendry, What keeps in-house counsel up at night: Legal department management and cybersecurity topped the list of concerns in Canadian Lawyer’s Annual Corporate Counsel Survey, Canadian Lawyer Mag.com, November/December 2017:

“Are you using Alternative Service Providers? Not Using 84%”

[83] 2017 State of the Industry Survey, Corporate Legal Operations Consortium, November 2017; Jennifer Brown, CLOC survey shows in-house legal departments cost less, but external still getting big piece of budget, Canadian Lawyer, November 17, 2017:

“Legal departments are showing themselves to be cost effective, but they are still sending out a good portion of work to external providers, according to a survey from the Corporate Legal Operations Consortium.

CLOC released the results of its 2017 State of the Industry Survey, with findings from 156 member companies with US$10 billion of spend that represent 11 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies from 11 countries across 32 industries. About six per cent of respondents to the survey were from Canada.

The survey shows that 62 cents of every dollar spent on legal costs goes to external legal costs.

“I expected it to be closer to 50/50; that is generally the target for most in-house departments,” says Connie Brenton, CEO of CLOC and director of legal operations at NetApp Inc. “We are wondering if it means that funds are being spent to right-size the work, so they may be sending more work out to a third party, not necessarily an outside counsel but to an LSO [legal service outsourcer] in order to run the department efficiently.”

Biotech companies spent up to two times on legal costs compared to technology companies and nearly five times compared to manufacturing and energy companies. Financial services companies spent .88 per cent of their revenue on external legal costs — higher than all other industries except biotech.

Jeff Franke, corporate secretary of CLOC and chief of staff and assistant general counsel, legal operations at Yahoo, said the reality is most legal departments have not reached the 50/50 stage.

“I think what was surprising was the distribution relevant to the participant size. Typically, larger corporations do a better job of getting to 50/50, but this survey was fairly heavily weighted toward mid-size and large corporations and that suggests mid-size ones are further,” he says.  “Any legal department spend will also vary radically based on what’s going on in the company. If you’re doing a ton of M&A or you have some major litigation going on, it doesn’t take very much to really radically shift it.”

[84] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 2), Spend Matters.com, November 14, 2017.

[85] Amanda Griffin, Corporate Consumers Turn to Alternative Providers, JD Journal.com, November 21, 2017.

[86] Amanda Griffin, Corporate Consumers Turn to Alternative Providers, JD Journal.com, November 21, 2017. Also see, 2017 State of the Industry Survey, Corporate Legal Operations Consortium, November 2017.

[87] Bill Henderson, How Much Are Corporations In-Sourcing Legal Services?, Legal Evolution, May 2, 2017; Mark Cohen, Global Legal Tech is Transforming Service Delivery, Forbes, August 29, 2017;  Jayne R. Reardon, Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public, Good for the Lawyers, 7:2 St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics 304, 2017; Altman Weil, Law Firms in Transition 2017: An Altman Weil Flash Survey (“Two-thirds of firms report losing business to corporate law department insourcing”; “19%” losing business to “non-law firm providers of legal and quasi-legal services”); Altman Weil, Law Firms in Transition 2016: An Altman Weil Flash Survey (“68% of law firms report they are losing business to corporate law departments”; “19% of law firms report they are losing business to non-law firm providers of legal and quasi-legal services”); Mark Cohen and Liam Brown, New Players driving value for legal departments, CBA National, October 2, 2017; ALM Intelligence and Morrison & Foerster, General Counsel Up-At-Night Report, 2017 (73% of legal work is performed in-house).

[88] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017; Roy Strom, In 2018, Law Firms Will Face Greater Challenges than Slow Growth, The American Lawyer, December 22, 2017; Legal Executive Institute, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market: Transformation of Legal Services Market is Accelerating – Are Law Firms Ready?, Legal Executive Institute.com (Thomson Reuters), January 10, 2018.

[89] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]; Roy Strom, In 2018, Law Firms Will Face Greater Challenges than Slow Growth, The American Lawyer, December 22, 2017.

[90] Katie Walsh, Companies want lawyers to kill the billable hour, Financial Review, June 23, 2017.

[91] Katie Walsh, Companies want lawyers to kill the billable hour, Financial Review, June 23, 2017. Also see, Michael B. Rynowecer, How Clients Hire: Top Clients Impose Law Firm Hiring Moratorium, The Mad Clientist (BTI Consulting.com), January 10, 2018.

[92] Deloitte, The legal department of the future: How disruptive trends are creating a new business model for in-house legal, Deloitte Development, 2017. Also see, Eric Sigurdson, General Counsel and In-House Legal as Corporate Conscience: an evolutionary crossroads in the age of disruption, Sigurdson Post, June 29, 2017.

[93] Deloitte, The legal department of the future: How disruptive trends are creating a new business model for in-house legal, Deloitte Development, 2017. See, Gabrielle Orum Hernandez, UnitedLex to Support Bulk of DXC Technology’s In-House Department, The American Lawyer, December 8, 2017 (“the move marks the largest process outsourcing deal over a five-year period in history”).

[94] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]

[95] 2018 Industry Outlook, Major, Lindsey & Africa, 2017. Also see, Eric Sigurdson, General Counsel, Chief Legal Officers & In-House Counsel: Five New Year’s Resolutions – Leadership, Operations, Metrics, Technology, and External Counsel, Sigurdson Post, December 13, 2016.

[96] Bill Henderson, How Much Are Corporations In-Sourcing Legal Services?, Legal Evolution, May 2, 2017.

[97] Anthony Hilton, Why their profession’s failures mean lawyers don’t win top city jobs, Evening Standard, UK, September 22, 2016.

[98] Tara Weintritt, What GCs See as the Biggest Challenge Facing Firms, JDSupra.com, February 28, 2017. Also see, Jason Moyse and Aron Solomon, Remaking the law firm ecosystem, Canadian Lawyer, July 4, 2016; Deloitte, Future Trends for Legal Services: Global Research Study, June 2016 – “independent research study commissioned by Deloitte Legal. Findings are based on 243 quantitative survey responses, and 30 qualitative, in-depth interviews with in-house legal services purchasers, mainly occupying positions of CEOs, CFOs or General/Legal Counsel.”  Note: Corporate clients are changing their approach to buying legal services across the globe. Conventional law firms are no longer meeting today’s business needs. One in three companies surveyed want their legal services provider to bring industry, commercial and non-legal expertise, which currently they do not; as well, to be more savvy on global data and cyber protection issues and more pro-active in sharing knowledge across many jurisdictions. Traditional law firms are seen to be trailing other professional services firms in this area. The majority (55%) of participants in the study (legal counsel, general counsel, CEOs and CFOs) have taken or are considering a significant review of their legal suppliers.

[99] Jill Dessalines, Adapt or Die: Why Law Firms Must Change to Survive in Tomorrow’s Economy, Linkedin.com, March 6, 2017.

[100] The Fourth Industrial Revolution, or 4IR, is the fourth major industrial era since the initial Industrial Revolution of the 18th century. The Fourth Industrial Revolution can be described as a range of new technologies that are fusing the physical, digital and biological worlds, and impacting all disciplines, economies and industries. At its core is the combination of big data, analytics and physical technology – providing increasingly enhanced, customized offerings to help meet the needs of organizations and individuals that can adapt and evolve to changing situations and requirements over time. Central to this revolution are emerging technology breakthroughs in fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing and nanotechnology. Moreover, it is disrupting almost every industry in every country. And the breadth and depth of these changes herald the transformation of entire systems of production, management, and governance. Business leaders and senior executives and their trusted business and legal advisors need to understand their changing environment, challenge the assumptions of operating teams, and relentlessly innovate.  See, Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond, World Economic Forum, January 14, 2016; Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Risks and Benefits, Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2017; Ernst & Young, What is the Fourth Industrial Revolution? How will it affect business and society, EY (betterworkingworld.ey.com); Hugh Son, JP Morgan Software Does in Seconds What Took Lawyers360,000 Hours, Bloomberg, February 27, 2017; Alex Gray, The 10 skills you need to thrive in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Economic Forum, January 19, 2016.

[101] Graham Richardson, Navigating a Brave New World: Eversheds innovates, The Practice (Vol. 2, Issue 2), Harvard Law School: Center on the Legal Profession (thepractice.law.harvard.edu), January 2016. Also see, Steven Walker, 6 things modern GCs really want: from their law firms, LinkedIn, November 27, 2017.

[102] Mark Cohen, ‘Legal Innovation’ is not an Oxymoron – It’s Farther Along Than you Think, Forbes, March 14, 2017.

[103] Steven Walker, Six things modern GCs really want from their law firms, LinkedIn, November 27, 2017 (republished: Remaking Law Firms.com, December 7, 2017; and Ross Intelligence.com, January 5, 2018).

[104] Steven Walker, Six things modern GCs really want from their law firms, LinkedIn, November 27, 2017 (republished: Remaking Law Firms.com, December 7, 2017; and Ross Intelligence.com, January 5, 2018).

[105] Steven Walker, Six things modern GCs really want from their law firms, LinkedIn, November 27, 2017 (republished: Remaking Law Firms.com, December 7, 2017; and Ross Intelligence.com, January 5, 2018); Eric Sigurdson, General Counsel, Chief Legal Officers & In-House Counsel: Five New Year’s Resolutions – Leadership, Operations, Metrics, Technology, and External Counsel, Sigurdson Post, December13, 2016.

[106] Steven Walker, Six things modern GCs really want from their law firms, LinkedIn, November 27, 2017 (republished: Remaking Law Firms.com, December 7, 2017; and Ross Intelligence.com, January 5, 2018).

[107] Canadian Bar Association, The Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues, June 2013.

[108] Karen Deuschle, Chief Legal Officers Survey results reveal CLO’s biggest concerns, Thomson Reuters.com, June 2017; ACC Chief Legal Officers 2017 Survey, Association of Corporate Counsel.

[109] 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2017 Georgetown Report’). Also see, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’); Legal Executive Institute, 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market: Transformation of Legal Services Market is Accelerating – Are Law Firms Ready?, Legal Executive Institute.com (Thomson Reuters), January 10, 2018.

[110] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017; 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute.

[111] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017.

[112] Goodreads.com.

[113] Ron Friedman, Will All Law Firms Eventually Corporatize?, LinkedIn, December 17, 2017:

“Multiple factors drive the trend, all pushing in the same direction for at least the last ten years:

• Scaleis a big one; maintaining a traditional partnership model with high levels of autonomy becomes very challenging as firms get large and spread globally. Corporates developed successful, proven models for managing scale a long time back and the larger professional services firms have been adopting many of those.
• Professional Business Management. The hiring by many law firms of numerous experienced business professionals from the corporate world has introduced more corporate management styles,
• Alternative Business Structures in the UK have introduced non-lawyer ownership and, with that, has come both professional management and corporate governance.
• Alternative Legal Service Providers (ALSP).In the last few years, as alternative legal service models, start-ups and now a new ecosystem of legal tech have emerged, conventional firms have begun to adopt some of their features.

With these changes, I see a fundamental tipping point. As with many critical shifts, this one has gone largely unremarked: the default business model for a new legal service business is no longer the partnership.”

[114] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017; Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[115] Claire Bushey, Law in 2018: It’s looking a little “Hunger Games” out there, Crain’s Chicago Business, December 29, 2017.

[116] Rose Walker, Reed Smith weighs up alternative business structure conversion for London Office, Legal Week.com, November 28, 2017; Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017; Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015; Mark Cohen, Manifest Destiny Law Firm Style, Legal Mosaic, April 19, 2015; Dan Bindman, HR consultancy and pensions provider enter legal market with ABSs, Legal Futures, March 25, 2015.

[117] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]

[118] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]

[119] Mitchell Kowalski, Avoiding Extinction: Reimagining Legal Services for the 21st Century, 2012. Also see, Altman Weil, 2016 Chief Legal Officer Survey (“lack of innovation in service delivery by law firms”); Mitch Kowalski, McGill study reveals the ‘illusion’ of innovation at Canadian law firms, National Post, January 26, 2017 (“while Canadian law firms talk a good ‘innovation’ game, little innovation is actually taking place”); Aly R Haji, The Illusion of Innovation at Canadian Law Firms, McGill University (Faculty of Management, Supervised by Prof. Karl Moore, mentorship support and guidance from Mike Ross and strategy consultant Juniper), jnper.com, January 2017.

[120] Mark Cohen, Why US Legal Regulation Needs a British Makeover, Forbes, October 17, 2016.

[121] Beverley McLachlin, Legal Profession in the 21^st Century: Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada (2015 Canadian Bar Association Plenary), Supreme Court of Canada, August 14, 2015; Canadian Bar Association, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, August 2014; International Bar Association, ‘Times are a-changin’: disruptive innovation and the legal profession, IBA Legal Policy & Research Unit, May 2016; Law Society of England and Wales, The Future of Legal Services, January 2016; ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Report on the Future of Legal Services in the United States, August 2016; Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal about when Counsel is Most Needed, 2010, 37 Fordham Urban L.J. 37 (citing Legal Services Corporation, Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low Income Americans, updated report (Washington, D.C.: Legal Services Corporation, September 2009); Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, Access to Civil and Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change, 2013; Dr. George Beaton, 10 reasons BigLaw managing partners are not sleeping very well, Beaton Capital, August 15, 2015.  [Lawyers are increasingly unaffordable to most individuals: Statistics support the view that accessing the justice system with the help of a legal professional is increasingly unaffordable to most people. According to an American study from a few years ago, as much as 70%-90% of legal needs in society go unmet.  Among the hardest hit are the middle class – who earn too much to qualify for legal aid, but frequently not enough to retain a lawyer for a matter of any complexity or length.  Additionally, members of poor and vulnerable groups are particularly prone to legal problems. Increasingly, these needs are being addressed by providers outside the legal profession, including those within the early resolution services sector. Sophisticated corporate clients are demanding delivery of quality legal services more efficiently and at less cost. The power balance between lawyers and their corporate clients has shifted, intensifying price-down pressure on law firms, in particular BigLaw.]

[122]  Mary E. Juetten, How can technology solve our access to justice crisis?, ABA Journal, September 8, 2017. Also see, Malcolm Mercer, Being in Favour of Reform, Just Not Change, Slaw, February 26, 2014 (“Should we care about the 85% of legal needs that are not addressed by lawyers? … The next question is why are lawyers used for less than 15% of legal needs?”); Jayne Reardon, Embrace a New Law Model to Better Serve Public and Lawyers, 2 Civility.org, November 29, 2016 (“Many studies over the last few decades reveal that an increasing segment of the population, primarily low and moderate income Americans, are not accessing legal services.  For only one example, Deborah Rhode documents in her research that “[a]ccording to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”); Dr. George Beaton, 10 reasons BigLaw managing partners are not sleeping very well, Beaton Capital, August 15, 2015 (Lawyers are increasingly unaffordable to most individuals: Statistics support the view that accessing the justice system with the help of a legal professional is increasingly unaffordable to most people. According to an American study from a few years ago, as much as 70%-90% of legal needs in society go unmet.  Among the hardest hit are the middle class – who earn too much to qualify for legal aid, but frequently not enough to retain a lawyer for a matter of any complexity or length.  Additionally, members of poor and vulnerable groups are particularly prone to legal problems. Increasingly, these needs are being addressed by providers outside the legal profession, including those within the early resolution services sector.); Beverley McLachlin, Legal Profession in the 21^st Century: Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief Justice of Canada (2015 Canadian Bar Association Plenary), Supreme Court of Canada, August 14, 2015:

“Statistics support the view that accessing the justice system with the help of a legal professional is increasingly unaffordable to most people. Nearly 12 million Canadians will experience at least one legal problem in a given three-year period, yet few will have the resources to solve them. According to an American study from a few years ago, as much as 70%-90% of legal needs in society go unmet. We all know that unresolved legal problems adversely affect people’s lives and, ultimately, the public purse. Among the hardest hit are the middle class – who earn too much to qualify for legal aid, but frequently not enough to retain a lawyer for a matter of any complexity or length. Additionally, members of poor and vulnerable groups are particularly prone to legal problems, and legal problems tend to lead to problems of other types, such as health issues.”

[123] Jayne R. Reardon, Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public, Good for the Lawyers, 7:2 St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics 304, 2017; Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015; Chris Pierce-Wright, Report: The Unmet Legal Needs of America’s Small Business Community, Insight: Center for Community Economic Development, August 2015 (“With legal fees that price out most of the country’s businesses and individuals, necessity dictates that small businesses and community organizations either look elsewhere for legal support or forego it altogether”). Also see, Improving access – tackling unmet legal needs: Risk Outlook update, Solicitors Regulation Authority, June 2017; Malcolm Mercer, Access to Justice Needs Access to Research, Slaw, January 19, 2017; Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of A Public Forum, J. Prof. Law. 79, 2012.

[124] Mark Cohen, Global Legal Tech is Transforming Service Delivery, Forbes, August 29, 2017;  Jayne R. Reardon, Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public, Good for the Lawyers, 7:2 St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics 304, 2017; Altman Weil, Law Firms in Transition 2017: An Altman Weil Flash Survey (“Two-thirds of firms report losing business to corporate law department insourcing”; “19%” losing business to “non-law firm providers of legal and quasi-legal services”); Altman Weil, Law Firms in Transition 2016: An Altman Weil Flash Survey (“68% of law firms report they are losing business to corporate law departments”; “19% of law firms report they are losing business to non-law firm providers of legal and quasi-legal services”); Mark Cohen and Liam Brown, New Players driving value for legal departments, CBA National, October 2, 2017; ALM Intelligence and Morrison & Foerster, General Counsel Up-At-Night Report, 2017 (73% of legal work is performed in-house).

[125] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]; Roy Strom, In 2018, Law Firms Will Face Greater Challenges than Slow Growth, The American Lawyer, December 22, 2017. Also see, Hugh Simons, Overpriced, Overgrown, And Overlapped: BigLaw’s Fragile Fundamentals And How They’ll Play Out When Recession Hits, Above the Law, November 7, 2017; Claire Bushey, Law in 2018: It’s looking a little “Hunger Games” out there, Crain’s Chicago Business, December 29, 2017.

[126] Christine Simmons, Dozens of Law Firms Called it Quits in 2017, New York Law Journal, December 19, 2017 (“The pace of law firm dissolutions will likely keep up in the new year, said industry observers, as the same challenging market conditions prevail. Dozens of law firms bit the dust this year, either through acquisitions or complete dissolutions.”); The year in perspective: Disappearing law firm brands in 2017, Global Legal Post, December 22, 2017; Cliff Roitelle, Law Firm In Trouble, LinkedIn, November 22, 2017 (“ Sedgwick LLP joins Heller, Thacher Proffit & Wood, Thelen, Dewey, Howrey and other AM Law 100 & 200 firms, and will be closing its doors at year-end.”); Roy Strom, As More Partners Depart, Sedgwick Confirms Plans to Close, The American Lawyer, November 27, 2017 (“ The San Francisco-based Am Law 200 firm will dissolve in early January, although London-based Clyde & Co could emerge as a white knight to absorb the bulk of Sedgwick’s operations.”); Sedgwick to shut up shop after 85 years, Global Legal Post, November 23, 2017 (“In recent times the firm has been plagued with partner defections and in the past few weeks suffered another set-back when attempts to merge with Clyde & Co fell through. In 2017, Sedgwick reported income of $170.5 million and 274 lawyers.”); Heather Suttie, Legal Markets and Marketing: 10 Trends to Watch and Watch Out for in 2018, Heather Suttie.ca, January 14, 2018.

[127] Claire Bushey, Law in 2018: It’s looking a little “Hunger Games” out there, Crain’s Chicago Business, December 29, 2017. (citing, Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017).

[128] Neil Rickman and James Anderson, Innovations in the Provision of Legal Services in the United States: An Overview for Policymakers, Kauffman-Rand Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy, 2011. Also see, Laurel Terry, The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 29 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1, 2009; Mark Cohen, The Pond Seems Wider: The Regulator Gap Between UK and U.S. Legal Practice, Legal Mosaic, May 4, 2015.

[129] Julius Melnitzer, Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game, Lexpert Magazine, September 2017.

[130] Julius Melnitzer, Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game, Lexpert.ca, September 11, 2017.

[131] Jonathan Smithers, Evolution of legal services: The impact of ABS in England & Wales, CBA National, October 26, 2015. Also see: CBA Legal Futures Initiative, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, Canadian Bar Association (CBA.org), August 2014 (“Internationally, expectations in client service are being transformed by the growth of alternate business structures (ABSs) which permit non-lawyer investment and ownership, and multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) which combine legal services with other professional services.”); Derek Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An overview of the legal and ethical parameters, 67 Fordham Law Review 2581, 1999:

“The argument in favor of UPL [unauthorized practice of law] rules “assumes that clients cannot be trusted to choose for themselves whether they want to pay for the extra protection of a [lawyer] generalist instead of the narrower protection of a non-lawyer specialist.” In addition, even “clients who are aware of the limitations on the abilities and ethics of non-lawyers might rationally want to hire them despite their shortcomings because, in a free competitive market for legal services, those shortcomings will bring lower prices”. …  The cost of a lawyer’s services is a common factor cited for not seeking a lawyer’s services. … The public may not desire the “protection” that the bar and the courts have instituted on their behalf.”

[132] Professional Services Market Global Report 2017, The Business Research Company.com; Law Firms Face Increasing Competition from Non-Traditional Sources, SB Wire.com, October 30, 2017.

[133] Julius Melnitzer, Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game, Lexpert.ca, September 11, 2017; Debra Cassens Weiss, PwC to open US law firm, a sign of increasing focus on legal operations by Big 4 accounting firms, ABA Journal, September 21, 2017 (“Law firm leaders are waking up to the Big Four threat, the ALM report says. Sixty-six percent of partners surveyed said they were concerned about alternative legal service providers and accounting firms, and 64 percent said accounting firms moving into the legal industry was a bigger threat than the expansion of in-house legal departments, e-discovery vendors and legal process outsourcing companies.”); PwC’s new US law firm heightens fears, Financial Review, October 12, 2017; Elizabeth Olson, PwC, the Accounting Giant, Will Open  Law Firm in the US, New York Times, September 22, 2017; Alex Berry, PwC Launches On-Demand Flexible Lawyer Service for Clients, The American Lawyer, October 12, 2017; Eric Sigurdson, The Global Corporate Legal Market: Rise of the Big Four Accounting Firms as an alternative legal services delivery model – from ‘multidisciplinary’ professional service firms to ‘globally integrated’ business solution providers, Sigurdson Post, March 27, 2017.

[134] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]

[135] Julius Melnitzer, Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game, Lexpert.ca, September 11, 2017.

[136] Alexander Brown, The wold continues to go virtual, Linkedin.com, December 6, 2017.

[137] Laurel Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing to Protect Consumers, 82 Fordham Law Review 2683, 2014.

[138] Charlie Taylor, Artificial Intelligence set to rewrite rules for legal profession, The Irish Times, November 23, 2017.

[139] For a full discussion on this topic, see Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[140] Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such a Thing as an Affordable Lawyer?, The Atlantic, May 30, 2014.

[141] The Legal AI ‘Barbarians’ Have Already Taken the Gates, Artificial Lawyer, December 1, 2017.

[142] David Burgess, 9,096 GCs interviewed about their law firms’ adoption of innovative working methods, such as technology and AI: How do the UK’s Top 50 law firms stack up?, LinkedIn (Publishing Director, The Legal 500 Series), November 3, 2016 – 2016 Client Intelligence Report.

[143] The Case Against Clones, The Economist, February 2, 2013.

[144] Clifford Winston, Robert Crandall, Vikram Maheshri, First Thing We Do, Let’s Deregulate All the Lawyers, Brookings Institution Press, 2011

[145] For example: Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015;  Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing to Protect Consumers, 82 Fordham Law Review 2683, 2014; Mark Cohen, Goodbye Guild – Law’s Changing Culture, Forbes, July 3, 2017 (“The frequent penalty flags thrown at retail upstarts like LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer, and AVVO are not so much about protecting the public from unscrupulous, illegitimate providers as they are about protecting lawyers from competition, thereby maintaining traditional legal culture and its monopoly. No wonder so many people hate lawyers.”); Exclusive: LegalZoom accused of using ABS To ‘unlawfully practise law’ in the US, Legal Futures.co.uk, December 22, 2017:

“Alternative business structure (ABS) LegalZoom Legal Services is being sued in the United States as part of a claim that its American parent company is engaged in the unauthorised practice of law (UPL), Legal Futures can reveal. …

While the concept of UPL does not exist in the UK, the notion of unregulated legal services providers does not exist in the US. Only licensed lawyers who are members of their state bar are permitted to deliver legal services.

LegalZoom is not a US law firm, though it has long been dubbed the best-known legal brand in America. It started out as an online legal document provider, and then introduced access to third-party lawyers through subscription plans.

As part of the third stage of its development, it launched an ABS in England and Wales and acquired Yorkshire law firm Beaumont Law. …

The claim said its goal was “to expose the wilful and systematic acts of unauthorised practice of law, false advertising and unfair competition by LegalZoom … The claim alleged that, in various recorded interviews, LegalZoom CEO John Suh “falsely implied… that it can provide legal services in the United States” after becoming a law firm in the UK. …

In a statement, Kenneth Friedman, LegalZoom’s managing counsel, said: “LegalZoom follows all legal requirements and applicable ethical regulations. We look forward to defending ourselves and are confident we will prevail. We are seeing an aspiring competitor angrily lash out after failing to compete in the marketplace. We will not be distracted, but rather will maintain focus on our critical mission of increasing affordable access to the law.”

[146] Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Business Structures for Legal Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 Georgetown Journal of International Law 665, 2016:

“A broad interpretation of unauthorized practice statutes is increasingly intellectually indefensible, especially because of a concern that the impetus to exclude others is motivated by a desire to give lawyers a competitive advantage.”

Also see for example only: Victor Li, Avvo, LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer CEOs say their products help bridge access-to-justice gap, ABA Journal, March 17, 2017 (“While all three CEOs have frequently faced questions about regulations governing the unauthorized practice of law, the trio did not use the Techshow stage to rage about the issue, or about regulations in general”); Richard Granat, North Carolina Restricts the Distribution of Legal Self-Help Software to Consumers, eLawyering Blog, July 12, 2016; Joan Rogers, N.C. Law Regulates LegalZoom, Other Legal Doc Providers, Bloomberg Law, July 26, 2016; Robert Amrogi, Latest legal victory has LegalZoom poised for growth, ABA Journal, August 1, 2014; George Leef, Why the Legal Profession Says LegalZoom is Illegal, Forbes, October 14, 2014; Mary Jutten, Technology and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, Law Technology Today, June 12, 2015.

[147] Kai Jacob, Dierk Schindler, Roger Strathausen (editors), Liquid Legal: Transforming Legal into a Business Savvy, Information Enabled and Performance Driven Industry, Springer International Publishing, 2017; Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers: Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services, Oxford University Press, 2008; Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to your Future, Oxford University Press, 2013; Mark Cohen, Postcards from Europe; Part 1: London, Forbes, October 9, 2017; Forces of change in legal marketplace too powerful for Magic Circle to avoid, Global Legal Post, October 11, 2017.

[148] Dan Bindman, Chatbot entrepreneur predicts automated legal future, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 23, 2017.

[149] Dan Bindman, Chatbot entrepreneur predicts automated legal future, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 23, 2017.

[150] Charlie Taylor, Artificial Intelligence set to rewrite rules for legal profession, The Irish Times, November 23, 2017.

[151] Sebastian Haire, Artificial Intelligence Shouldn’t Scare the Legal Sector. It Should Excite It., Thomson Reuters Elite.com, Q4 2017 (and reprinted in LinkedIn, November 21, 2017). Also see, Dan Storbeaek, Trends in Legal Tech 2018, SecurePrivacy.AI/LegalTechTrends, powerpoint presentation, November 22, 2017; Dan Storbaek, What can Law Firms do to get ahead on Legal Tech, Linkedin.com, November 24, 2017. Also see, The Future of the Legal Profession, Law Society of Western Australia, December 12, 2017.

[152] Dan Storbeaek, Trends in Legal Tech 2018, SecurePrivacy.AI/LegalTechTrends, powerpoint presentation, November 22, 2017; Dan Storbaek, What can Law Firms do to get ahead on Legal Tech, Linkedin.com, November 24, 2017.

[153] Mark Cohen, Legal Buyers Taking Charge: ‘The GC Thought Leaders Experiment’ and Beyond, Forbes, July 17, 2017; Mark Cohen and Liam Brown, New Players driving value for legal departments, CBA National, October 2, 2017’ Jordan Furlong, Law is a Buyer’s Market: Building a Client-First Law Firm, Law Twenty-one, 2017.

[154] Ralph Baxter, A Framework for Success: The 21^st Century Law Firm Business Model, Legal Executive Institute.com, November 24, 2015.

[155] Ralph Baxter, A Framework for Success: The 21^st Century Law Firm Business Model, Legal Executive Institute.com, November 24, 2015.

[156] Mark Cohen, Global Legal Tech is Transforming Service Delivery, Forbes, August 29, 2017.

[157] Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Business Structures for Legal Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 Georgetown Journal of International Law 665, 2016. Also see, Mark Cohen, Global Legal Tech is Transforming Service Delivery, Forbes, August 29, 2017.

[158] Mark Cohen, Global Legal Tech is Transforming Service Delivery, Forbes, August 29, 2017.

[159] Aebra Coe, 3 Ways to Drive Clients Out the Door, Law 360, November 28, 2017.

[160] See, Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[161] For example, see: Julius Melnitzer, Accounting Firms in Law: The Long Game, Lexpert.ca, September 11, 2017:

“In the UK, PwC, KPMG, EY and 110 other accounting firms have obtained alternative business structure (ABS) licences, which allow them to offer a … growing spectrum of legal services. The factors enabling this market expansion include changes to legal regulatory frameworks, as the introduction of ABS entities demonstrates, and the globalization of the legal market.”

[162] Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015. Also see, Jakob Weberstaedt, English Alternative Business Structures and the European single market, 21 International Journal of the Legal Profession, 2014. See generally: Va. State Bar, Report: The Committee on the Future of Law Practice 13 (Sept. 24, 2016); The Future of Legal Services, Law Society of England and Wales, January 2016; Malcolm Mercer and Susan McGrath (Co-Chairs Alternative Business Structures Working Group), Alternative Business Structures in Ontario, Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014; Andrew Grech and Tahlia Gordon, Should Non-Lawyer Ownership be Endorsed and Encouraged?, Georgetown Law Center For the Study of the Legal Profession, May 2015.

[163] John Kelly, Partnership Impediment to Innovation in Law “The PIIL Factor” A Future Law Perspective, Linkedin.com May 19, 2015. Also see, Heidi Gardner, Smart Collaboration: How Professionals and Their Firms Succeed by Breaking Down Silos, Harvard Business Review Press, January 2017; Kevin Sullivan, Why Collaboration in Law Firms and Other Professional Services is Important, Kevinlsullivan.com, March 3, 2017; Roger Trapp, Working With Others is the Key to Success, Forbes, February 28, 2017.

[164] Ken Grady, We Need to Understand the Rules to Play the Game, Algorithmic Society, September 24, 2017.

[165] Ken Grady, We Need to Understand the Rules to Play the Game, Algorithmic Society, September 24, 2017.

[166] Sandra Rubin, Funding Legal Innovation in Canada, Lexpert.ca, June 27, 2016.

[167] Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015;  Exclusive: LegalZoom accused of using ABS To ‘unlawfully practise law’ in the US, Legal Futures.co.uk, December 22, 2017:

“Alternative business structure (ABS) LegalZoom Legal Services is being sued in the United States as part of a claim that its American parent company is engaged in the unauthorised practice of law (UPL), Legal Futures can reveal. …

While the concept of UPL does not exist in the UK, the notion of unregulated legal services providers does not exist in the US. Only licensed lawyers who are members of their state bar are permitted to deliver legal services.

LegalZoom is not a US law firm, though it has long been dubbed the best-known legal brand in America. It started out as an online legal document provider, and then introduced access to third-party lawyers through subscription plans.

As part of the third stage of its development, it launched an ABS in England and Wales and acquired Yorkshire law firm Beaumont Law. …

The claim said its goal was “to expose the wilful and systematic acts of unauthorised practice of law, false advertising and unfair competition by LegalZoom … The claim alleged that, in various recorded interviews, LegalZoom CEO John Suh “falsely implied… that it can provide legal services in the United States” after becoming a law firm in the UK. …

In a statement, Kenneth Friedman, LegalZoom’s managing counsel, said: “LegalZoom follows all legal requirements and applicable ethical regulations. We look forward to defending ourselves and are confident we will prevail. We are seeing an aspiring competitor angrily lash out after failing to compete in the marketplace. We will not be distracted, but rather will maintain focus on our critical mission of increasing affordable access to the law.”

[168] BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017, New Law Firm Structures and Models, BDO, September 2017.

[169] Jordan Furlong, 9 Emerging Truths about Legal Service Delivery, CBA.org, Spring 2016.

[170] Stuart Barr, What will the law firms of the future look like?, HighQ.com, November 9, 2016. Also see, Shari Davidson, Confessions of a Legal Recruiter: Law is change, are you still relevant?, Above the Law, December 6, 2017.

[171] Friedrich Blasé, Sooner Than You Think! When Do Law Firms Need to Take Alternative Legal Providers Seriously?, Legal Executive Institute (Thomson Reuters), March 15, 2016.

[172] Christine Simmons, Dozens of Law Firms Called it Quits in 2017, New York Law Journal, December 19, 2017; The year in perspective: Disappearing law firm brands in 2017, Global Legal Post, December 22, 2017; Cliff Roitelle, Law Firm In Trouble, LinkedIn, November 22, 2017 (“ Sedgwick LLP joins Heller, Thacher Proffit & Wood, Thelen, Dewey, Howrey and other AM Law 100 & 200 firms, and will be closing its doors at year-end.”); Roy Strom, As More Partners Depart, Sedgwick Confirms Plans to Close, The American Lawyer, November 27, 2017 (“ The San Francisco-based Am Law 200 firm will dissolve in early January, although London-based Clyde & Co could emerge as a white knight to absorb the bulk of Sedgwick’s operations.”); Sedgwick to shut up shop after 85 years, Global Legal Post, November 23, 2017 (“In recent times the firm has been plagued with partner defections and in the past few weeks suffered another set-back when attempts to merge with Clyde & Co fell through. In 2017, Sedgwick reported income of $170.5 million and 274 lawyers.”); Heather Suttie, Legal Markets and Marketing: 10 Trends to Watch and Watch Out for in 2018, Heather Suttie.ca, January 14, 2018.

[173] Comment to Peter Carayiannis’s (President, Conduit Law) LinkedIn share of article entitled: Sedgwick to shut up shop after 85 years, Global Legal Post, November 23, 2017. Also see, Christine Simmons, Dozens of Law Firms Called it Quits in 2017, New York Law Journal, December 19, 2017 –  “The pace of law firm dissolutions will likely keep up in the new year, said industry observers, as the same challenging market conditions prevail. Dozens of law firms bit the dust this year, either through acquisitions or complete dissolutions.”).

[174] Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017.

[175] Ajav Nanavati, Global leadership forum – acting on culture before it eats strategy, Linkedin.com, November 21, 2017.

[176] Professor Johnathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to Law Firm Short-Termism, Southern California Law Review 2015; Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017. Also see, Ralph Baxter, Looking at the Law Firm Partnership Model and How to Fix it, Thomson Reuters, February 25, 2015; Jeff Gray, Let non-lawyers own law firms: Canadian Bar Association, Globe and Mail, August 14, 2014:

“As the legal profession grapples with changes driven by new technology and global competition, a new report from the Canadian Bar Association calls for radical revisions to the rules that govern lawyers, including scrapping the current regime that prohibits most non-lawyer ownership of law firms. …

Citing the surprising collapse of law firm Heenan Blaikie LLP earlier this year without mentioning the firm’s name, the report outlines a number of problems with the partnership structure that currently dominates the legal business.

“The recent decline and demise of long-standing Canadian legal partnerships suggests that more research may be required on if and how the partnership model can be viable in the future,” the report reads.

The report says partnerships result in a lack of investment in innovation, since they tend to distribute profits to partners instead of retaining them for research, and a lack of “non-lawyer business professionals in management.”

[177] Jayne R. Reardon, Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public, Good for the Lawyers, 7:2 St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics 304, 2017.

[178] Christine Simmons, Dozens of Law Firms Called it Quits in 2017, New York Law Journal, December 19, 2017 (“The pace of law firm dissolutions will likely keep up in the new year, said industry observers, as the same challenging market conditions prevail. Dozens of law firms bit the dust this year, either through acquisitions or complete dissolutions.”); Elizabeth Olson, 2017 Record Year for Law Firm Mergers, BigLaw Business.com, January 3, 2018 (“new record with 102 mergers and acquisition … the law firm merger market is white hot”); The year in perspective: Disappearing law firm brands in 2017, Global Legal Post, December 22, 2017; Cliff Roitelle, Law Firm In Trouble, LinkedIn, November 22, 2017 (“ Sedgwick LLP joins Heller, Thacher Proffit & Wood, Thelen, Dewey, Howrey and other AM Law 100 & 200 firms, and will be closing its doors at year-end.”); Roy Strom, As More Partners Depart, Sedgwick Confirms Plans to Close, The American Lawyer, November 27, 2017 (“ The San Francisco-based Am Law 200 firm will dissolve in early January, although London-based Clyde & Co could emerge as a white knight to absorb the bulk of Sedgwick’s operations.”); Sedgwick to shut up shop after 85 years, Global Legal Post, November 23, 2017 (“In recent times the firm has been plagued with partner defections and in the past few weeks suffered another set-back when attempts to merge with Clyde & Co fell through. In 2017, Sedgwick reported income of $170.5 million and 274 lawyers.”). See, Jessica D. Gabel & Paul R. Hage, The Belly of the Beast: Law Firm Insolvencies, Unfinished Business, and Jewel Waivers, Business Law Today, August 2013; John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 Fordham Law Review 6, 2014; Allan Dodds Frank, The end of an era: Why Dewey & LeBoeuf went under, Fortune.com, May 29, 2012; Amanda Bronstad, Heller Ehrman’s fate echoes Brobeck’s collapse, National Law Journal, September 29, 2008; Nathan Koppel, The Rise and Fall of Thacher Proffitt, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2009; Erin Guchs, The Eight Most Crushing Law Firm Implosions in the Nation’s History, Business Insider, June 24, 2012; Julius Melnitzer, Another U.K. law firm collapse costs 250 jobs, Financial Post, March 12, 2013; Mark Cohen, The King & Wood Mallesons Collapse: Déjà vu All Over Again, Forbes, December 17, 2016; Jeff Gray and Sophie Cousineau, Death of a law firm: Behind the collapse of Heenan Blaikie, The Globe and Mail, February 7, 2014; Theresa Teesco and Brian Hutchinson, How Heenan Blaikie’s stunning collapse started with a rogue African arms deal, National Post, February 14, 2014; Julius Melnitzer, Another Canadian Law Firm will follow Heenan Blaikie to collapse in 2014, Deloitte report said to predict, National Post (Financial Post), March 12, 2014; Jeff Gray, The inside story of Heenan Blaikie’s frantic final days, Globe and Mail, March 19, 2017. Also see, John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 Fordham Law Review 6, 2014; Jan Wolfe, Law Firms Norton Rose Fulbright and Chadbourne & Parke to Merge, Reuters, February 21, 2017; Sara Randazzo, Law Firms Chadbourne & Parke and Norton Rose Fulbright to Combine: Norton Rose’s merger with 285-lawyer New York firm will create 4,000-lawyer powerhouse, Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2017; Sandra Rubin, Law Firm Mergers: The Canadian Rationale, Lexpert.ca, January 18, 2016; Jonathan Ratner, Canada’s legal giant Gowlings gets new boss, Financial Post, November 9, 2015; Chris Johnson, A Big Day for Big Law Mergers, American Lawyer, November 30, 2016; Anthony Lin, The Rise of the Megafirm, ABA Journal, September 1, 2015. Also see, Eric Sigurdson, A Way Forward: Disruptive Innovation, the Legal Profession, and the Client – what is the appropriate legal services delivery model in the ‘new normal’, Sigurdson Post, November 15, 2016; Roy Strom, The Untold Story Behind Big Law Mergers: Revenue Slips, Costs Rise, The American Lawyer, March 7, 2017; Jordan Furlong, How client succession is driving law firm consolidation, Law 21, September 22, 2016; Altman Weil MergerLine, AltmanWeil.com; Heather Suttie, Legal Markets and Marketing: 10 Trends to Watch and Watch Out for in 2018, Heather Suttie.ca, January 14, 2018.

[179] Mark Cohen, Law’s Distribution and Price Problems, Legal Mosaic, May 4, 2016.

[180] Suhas Baliga, Should you invest in building a corporate law firm today?, LinkedIn, November 30, 2017.

[181] Suhas Baliga, Should you invest in building a corporate law firm today?, LinkedIn, November 30, 2017.

[182] Mark Cohen, Law’s Distribution and Price Problems, Legal Mosaic, May 4, 2016.

[183] Debra Cassens Weiss, Declining productivity costs law firms an average of more than $74K per lawyer, report says, ABA Journal, January 12, 2018.

[184] D. Casey Flaherty, Law Firm Partners: If It Ain’t Broke…, 3 Geeks and a Law Firm Blog, July 24, 2016.

[185] See for example: Patrick McKenna, Do You Know What it Takes to Be an Effective Leader?, LinkedIn, January 8, 2018; Marcie Borgal Shunk, Why is Law Firm Innovation Failing? How to Push for Success, American Lawyer, December 13, 2017.

[186] Mark Cohen, Law’s Distribution and Price Problems, Legal Mosaic, May 4, 2016.

[187] James Bible, Why do law firms find innovation so difficult, Legal Business World.com, October 6, 2016.

[188] Professor Johnathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to Law Firm Short-Termism, Southern California Law Review 2015; Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013; Ralph Baxter, Looking at the Law Firm Partnership Model and How to Fix it, Thomson Reuters, February 25, 2015; William D. Henderson, More Complex than Greed, The American Lawyer (AxiomLaw.com), May 29, 2012; John Kelly, Partnership Impediment to Innovation in Law “The PIIL Factor” A Future Law Perspective, Linkedin.com May 19, 2015; Jordan Furlong, The lawyer vs. the law firm, CBA National Magazine, Fall 2016; International Bar Association, ‘Times are a-changin’: disruptive innovation and the legal profession, IBA Legal Policy & Research Unit, May 2016; Beverley Spencer, The Innovation Game, CBA National Magazine, Spring 2017, page 30; 2017 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com (“we see firms making only cursory investments where they should be aiming for broader, deeper transformation. And still many partners resist change in all its forms”); 2016 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com; 2015 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com – Law Firms in Transition Survey – the survey was conducted in March and April 2015. It polled managing partners and chairs at 320 US law firms employing 50 or more lawyers, including 47 per cent of the 350 largest law firms in the US: Thomas S Clay and Eric A Seeger, ‘Law Firms in Transition Survey’ (Altman Weil, 2015); Stephen Mayson, Law firm partnership: the Grand Delusion, Stephen Mayson.com, October 9, 2012; Norman Clark (ed.), Good Governance in Law Firms: A Strategic Approach to Executive Decision Making and Management Structures, International Bar Association, April 2014; Christopher Vaagt, Law Firm Strategies for the 21^st Century: Strategies for Success, International Bar Association, December 2013; Rebecca Normand-Hochman, Leadership for Lawyers: Essential Leadership Strategies for Law Firm Success, International Bar Association, September 2015.

[189] Jennifer Leonard, Retrain Your Lawyer Brain and Grow Your Business, Law Practice Today, December 14, 2017.

[190] Ralph Baxter, Looking at the Law Firm Partnership Model and How to Fix it, Thomson Reuters, February 25, 2015 [http://legalexecutiveinstitute.com/looking-at-the-law-firm-partnership-model-how-to-fix-it-by-ralph-baxter/]; Professor Johnathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to Law Firm Short-Termism, Southern California Law Review 2015; William D. Henderson, More Complex than Greed, The American Lawyer (AxiomLaw.com), May 29, 2012; John Kelly, Partnership Impediment to Innovation in Law “The PIIL Factor” A Future Law Perspective, Linkedin.com May 19, 2015; Jordan Furlong, The lawyer vs. the law firm, CBA National Magazine, Fall 2016; International Bar Association, ‘Times are a-changin’: disruptive innovation and the legal profession, IBA Legal Policy & Research Unit, May 2016; Beverley Spencer, The Innovation Game, CBA National Magazine, Spring 2017, page 30; 2017 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com (“we see firms making only cursory investments where they should be aiming for broader, deeper transformation. And still many partners resist change in all its forms”); 2016 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com; 2015 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, Altamanweil.com – Law Firms in Transition Survey – the survey was conducted in March and April 2015. It polled managing partners and chairs at 320 US law firms employing 50 or more lawyers, including 47 per cent of the 350 largest law firms in the US: Thomas S Clay and Eric A Seeger, ‘Law Firms in Transition Survey’ (Altman Weil, 2015).  Note:

Some leading experts have suggested that many issues affecting corporate clients is due to the law firm’s “outdated partnership model”, a “poor institutional choice for the delivery of legal services in today’s legal market.” The main reason is that the traditional model encourages partners to fixate on short-term gains rather than the long-term success of the firm.  For example:

• A law firm partnership is proprietary. Partners consider themselves first and foremost as proprietors of banks of clients and books of business. Their loyalty and commitment to the law firm is only as good as the law firm is able to sustain an environment for them that’s conducive to maximization of billings.
• Partners under invest in law firms. Their primary interest, often to the point of obsession, is to draw down the maximum allowable amount of income on the monthly basis that’s been apportioned to them by the firm Partnership represents a personal entitlement rather than a professional commitment to an organization. The law firm is just a shell like umbrella that is used to market their expertise and manage their client services.
• Law Firms in Transition Survey, conducted in 2015 revealed that 72.4 per cent of law firm leaders in the United States believe that the pace of change within the profession is increasing. However, 45 per cent of law firms surveyed cited partner resistance as one of the reasons for their firms not doing more to change their practices in order to compete. This was confirmed again in the 2016 survey.
• This is the “war that’s been raging within law firms”, the fight for control of the business between individual Partners and the law firm leadership, with the firm looking long term and the Partner level lawyer looking short term and with a ‘self-interest’.

[191] John Kelly, Partnership Impediment to Innovation in Law “The PIIL Factor” A Future Law Perspective, Linkedin.com May 19, 2015; Jordan Furlong, The lawyer vs. the law firm, CBA National Magazine, Fall 2016; Andrew Strickler, BigLaw’s New Bosses Will have Skills to Pay the Bills, Law360, February 19, 2013; David Perla, Democracy and Law Firm Leadership, Above the Law, July 26, 2016; Jeffrey Lowe, BigLaw 2016: A Look Ahead, Law360, January 12, 2016.

“In place of partners and committees, firm leadership roles will fall to “C-suite” executives with titles like “Chief Innovation Officer,” who will evaluate 10- and 20-year technology and cultural trends. CFOs and COOs will plan yearly capital investments and make day-to-day operational calls… In the process, experts say, firms will shed the inherent weaknesses of legal partnerships — slow, incremental committee decision-making, often thin management experience, easy dissolution, short-term planning — and replace it with a truly corporatized American law firm.

Many firms have in recent years modified parts of their business to better mimic other professional service businesses, such as implementing fixed fees, hiring non-lawyer CEOs, and outsourcing. Others are moving more aggressively to a corporate hierarchy they argue is better adapted for the overall survival of the business, rather than propped up by tradition to appease individual partners…. Many managing partners have had time since 2008 to realize that downward profit trends and changing attitudes about the value of legal services necessitate a stricter business discipline, and how more top down control can help make it happen.

In addition to the benefits of stability and cost controls, … flat-fee pricing and a de-emphasis of individual partners makes the firm’s business more understandable and appealing to clients who themselves work within a corporate structure.”

[192] John Olmstead, How Effective Law Firm Leadership Practices can help you Acquire and Keep your Clients, OlmsteadAssoc.com, 2010; Dom Esposito, My Client, My Book of Business vs. Firm Client, Firm Revenues?, LinkedIn, January 8, 2018.

[193] Patrick J. McKenna, Bullying, Lack of Respect, Me First, Law Firms Suffer the Behaviour they Tolerate, Legal Business World, October 21, 2016.

[194] Stephen Rex Brown, Cellino, of law firm Cellino and Barnes fame, threatens to ‘burn the place to the ground’ as split worsens, NY Daily News, November 27, 2017.

[195] 2018 Industry Outlook, Major, Lindsey & Africa, 2017.

[196] Twelve Ways to Improve your Firm in 2016, Altman Weil.com, 2016.

[197] Timothy Corcoran, Ten Things I’d Do Differently as a Law Firm CEO, Corcoran Law Biz Blog.com, March 28, 2013.

[198] Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015. Also see, Jakob Weberstaedt, English Alternative Business Structures and the European single market, 21 International Journal of the Legal Profession, 2014.

[199] Note: The Canadian Bar Association acknowledges that, “[t]he legal industry in Canada is not immune to the major macro trends that are transforming virtually every industry in the world” [Canadian Bar Association Legal Futures Initiative. “Trends and Issues”, June 2013, p, 4.]. These trends are altering the way that Canadians and Americans interact with their legal system and consume legal services. As consumers of legal services in Canada and the U.S. gain more access to new information and technology-based solutions, they have acquired more understanding and power. As noted by one legal commentator, “[c]lients want legal services to be more affordable and easier to access and now routine work can be outsourced or automated. Instead of hiring a lawyer to do basic legal research or write up a boilerplate contract, clients can find online law libraries, web services and apps to do the job for free – or on the cheap” [Leo Singer, Shaking Up the Academy, CBA National Magazine, Spring 2016].

[200] Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015. Also see, Jakob Weberstaedt, English Alternative Business Structures and the European single market, 21 International Journal of the Legal Profession, 2014.

[201] Timothy Corcoran, Ten Things I’d Do Differently as a Law Firm CEO, Corcoran Law Biz Blog.com, March 28, 2013.

[202] Professional Services Market Global Report 2017, The Business Research Company.com; Law Firms Face Increasing Competition from Non-Traditional Sources, SB Wire.com, October 30, 2017.

[203] Charlie Taylor, Artificial Intelligence set to rewrite rules for legal profession, The Irish Times, November 23, 2017; Kwokchee Cheung, Artificial Intelligence Will Replace Some Lawyers, Linkedin.com, November 24, 2017.

[204] Ralph Baxter, A Framework for Success: The 21^st Century Law Firm Business Model, Legal Executive Institute.com, November 24, 2015.

[205] Ralph Baxter, A Framework for Success: The 21^st Century Law Firm Business Model, Legal Executive Institute.com, November 24, 2015.

[206] Ralph Baxter, A Framework for Success: The 21^st Century Law Firm Business Model, Legal Executive Institute.com, November 24, 2015.

[207] Katie Walsh, Companies want lawyers to kill the billable hour, Financial Review, June 23, 2017.

[208] Andrew Karpie, Cutting BigLaw Down to Size: New Alternatives for Legal Services Procurement (Part 2), Spend Matters.com, November 14, 2017.

[209] Nick Hilborne, Legal Futures Conference: “Third of top 300 law firms will disappear by 2022”, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 22, 2017; Mark Cohen, The 2017 Georgetown Legal Report and the Sunset of the Traditional Law Firm Partnership Model, Legal Business World, February 7, 2017; Aebra Coe, The Rise of Pricing Professionals in BigLaw, Law 360, January 8, 2018; Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[210] Ralph Baxter, A Framework for Success: The 21^st Century Law Firm Business Model, Legal Executive Institute.com, November 24, 2015. Also see, Emma Ryan, 70% of US Law Grads ‘will never work in law’, Lawyers Weekly, December 5, 2017.

[211] Emma Ryan, 70% of US Law Grads ‘will never work in law’, Lawyers Weekly, December 5, 2017.

[212] Nick Hilborne, Legal Futures Conference: “Third of top 300 law firms will disappear by 2022”, Legal Futures.co.uk, November 22, 2017

[213] Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[214] CBA Legal Futures Initiative, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, Canadian Bar Association (CBA.org), August 2014.

[215] Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777. Also see, ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, For Comment: Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business Structures, AmericanBar.org, April 8, 2016, page 7-9; Gillian Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the (un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 International Review of Law and Economics 43, 2014; Malcolm Mercer and Susan McGrath (Co-Chairs Alternative Business Structures Working Group), Alternative Business Structures in Ontario, Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014; CBA Legal Futures Initiative, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, Canadian Bar Association (CBA.org), August 2014; Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015.

[216] BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017, New Law Firm Structures and Models, BDO, September 2017.

[217] Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[218] Legal services are essentially delivered to consumers today as they have been for the last Century – by lawyers (with limited exceptions for other licensed legal professionals such as paralegals), and then only through specific types of organizations that are owned and controlled by lawyers. In short, generally only licensed lawyers – in sole practice or in firms owned and controlled by lawyers – may provide legal services. These organizational forms or business structures are based on the “law firm partnership model” and may include general partnerships, limited liability partnerships, professional corporations, or limited liability companies. [see, Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017; Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013]

[219] Judith McMorrow, UK Alternative Business Structures for Legal Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the US, 47 Georgetown Journal of International Law 665, 2016.

[220] CBA Legal Futures initiative, Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, August 2014; Jeff Gray, Let non-lawyers own law firms: Canadian Bar Association, Globe and Mail, August 14, 2014. Also see: Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013. See generally, Laurel S. Terry, The Work of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, in Steven McGarry and Laurel Terry, Multidisciplinary Practices and Partnerships: Lawyers, Consultants, and Clients 2.20 (2002); Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1529, 1532 (2000); ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Report on the Future of Legal Services in the United States, American Bar Association (American Bar.org), August 2016; ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, For Comment: Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business Structures, American Bar Association (AmericanBar.org), April 8, 2016; David B. Wilkins and Maria Jose Esteban, The Reemergence of the Big Four in Law: their rise, transformation, and potential triumph, The Practice (Vol. 2, Issue 2), Harvard Law School: Center on the Legal Profession (thepractice.law.harvard.edu), January 2016 — citing the core values of the legal profession—conflict of interest, independence, and client privilege—in 2000/2001 the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates rejected the recommendation of its own Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct be amended to permit integrated MDPs such as the ‘then’ Big Five’s legal networks. Recently the American Bar Association’s 2020 Commission on the Future of Professional Regulation debated and again rejected a proposal to allow MDPs that would support the ‘now’ Big Four, although in Recommendation #2 suggesting that “continued exploration of alternative business structures (ABS) will be useful, and where ABS is allowed, evidence and data regarding the risks and benefits associated with these entities should be developed and assessed”;  ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Report on the Future of Legal Services in the United States, American Bar Association (American Bar.org), August 2016; And see, Reid Trautz, Will Alternative Business Structures Fly?, Attorney at Work.com (U.S.), September 27, 2016:

“What’s the Solution?

So will the profession change the rules and allow ABSs? We live in a state-bar world. There are 51 jurisdictions regulating lawyers. That means 51 different regulatory systems creating 51 ABS ownership variations. That means 51 state bar decisions on whether or not to allow ABSs followed by 51 decisions by state supreme courts or legislatures. With most state bars led by solo and small-firm lawyers, it will take years for the states to decide these issues.

While the legal profession ignores or defers the issue, unauthorized forms of ABSs will quietly infiltrate the market. These businesses — backed by non-lawyer investors — are already delivering legal services. While most lawyers can easily name one or two of these companies, there are hundreds more in development. If our profession can’t find the time to decide whether or not to allow ABSs, how are we going to unite to fight these unauthorized businesses?

The solution lies in simultaneously allowing ABSs, while expanding regulation to all legal services providers. That is the only way to expand the delivery of legal services, protect consumers, and maintain the integrity of the legal profession.

We need to address it now. To do nothing would leave lawyers at a huge competitive disadvantage and fundamentally change the legal profession as we know it today — and that’s just what non-lawyers are hoping we do.”

[221] Mark Cohen, What’s A Lawyer Worth?, Forbes, December 4, 2017. Also see, Debra Cassens Weiss, What are lawyers worth? Self-regulation perpetuated ‘bespoke myth’ op-ed says, ABA Journal, December 7, 2017.

[222] CBA Legal Futures Initiative, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, Canadian Bar Association (CBA.org), August 2014. Also see, Jeff Gray, Let non-lawyers own law firms: Canadian Bar Association, Globe and Mail, August 14, 2014.

[223] Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013; Jayne R. Reardon, Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public, Good for the Lawyers, 7:2 St. Mary’s Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics 304, 2017; Chandler N. Hodge, Law Firms in the U.S.: To Go Public or Not to Go Public?, 34 U. Dayton L. Rev. 79, 2008 (labeling the ABA’s resistance as a “ABA’s medieval guild mentality” which has created an inefficient cartel in the practice of law and engaged in regulatory capture of the legal industry which represents 2% of U.S. GDP); Brian MacEwen et al., Law Firm, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 61, 2008 (“Firms have grown substantially, with many containing more than one thousand lawyers.”).

[224] Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017; ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, For Comment: Issues Paper Regarding Alternative Business Structures, AmericanBar.org, April 8, 2016, page 7-9; Gillian Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the (un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 International Review of Law and Economics 43, 2014; Malcolm Mercer and Susan McGrath (Co-Chairs Alternative Business Structures Working Group), Alternative Business Structures in Ontario, Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014; CBA Legal Futures Initiative, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, Canadian Bar Association (CBA.org), August 2014; Laura Snyder, Does the UK know something we don’t about alternative business structures?, ABA Journal, January 2015; Neil Rose, PwC: New business structures and capital will allow big law firms to deliver ‘fundamental change’, Legal Futures.co.uk, October 16, 2017; PwC, 26^th Annual Law Firm’s Survey: Time for change – PwC Law Firms’ Survey 2017, PwC.co.uk, 2017.

[225] Richard Devlin and Ora Morison, Access to Justice and the Ethics and Politics of Alternative Business Structures, 91:3 Canadian Bar Review 483, 2012; Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 777, 2013; Alternative Business Structures Have Had A Transformational Impact in Delivering Legal Services, LawTeacher, 2015; Malcolm Mercer and Susan McGrath (Co-Chairs Alternative Business Structures Working Group), Alternative Business Structures and the Legal Profession in Ontario: A Discussion Paper, Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014.

[226] Casey Sullivan, Should Business Managers Run Law Firms, Bloomberg Law (Big Law Business.com), October 10, 2017; Gerry Riskin, Lawyers or Business Experts: Who Should Be in Charge?, GerryRiskin.com, October 26, 2017.

[227] David Curle, Why Size Matters: Big Four Accounting Firms Poised to Move In, Thomson Reuters, April 8, 2015.

[228] Timothy Corcoran, Ten Things I’d Do Differently as a Law Firm CEO, Corcoran Law Biz Blog.com, March 28, 2013; Eric Sigurdson, Alternative Business Structures, Competition, and Legal Services Delivery: The Case for ABSs v. the Legal Profession’s Monopoly in North America, Sigurdson Post, November 7, 2017.

[229] Keith Coats, A Warning to Leaders: Turbulence is not the Danger, Tomorrow Today Global.com, November 15, 2011.

[230] Patrick Dransfield, The new spectrum of legal services, LinkedIn, October 20, 2016.

[231] Patrick Dransfield, The new spectrum of legal services, LinkedIn, October 20, 2016.

[232] Mark Cohen, ‘Legal Innovation’ is not an Oxymoron – It’s Farther Along Than you Think, Forbes, March 14, 2017.

[233] Bill Josten, Resolutions for 2018: A Short List for Legal Practitioners from the Legal Executive, Legal Executive Institute.com, January 4, 2018; Stephen Mabey, Seven New Year’s Resolutions for Canadian Law Firms, LinkedIn, January 5, 2018. See: Patrick Lamb, The Law Firm of the Future, In Search of the Perfect Client Service (Patrick J Lamb.com), January 11, 2018:

The takeaways … are:

1. Being “a law firm” is becoming more and more of hindrance, since it limits the areas where you can serve as a problem-solver.
2. An effective business model will require the ability to do work that Legal Services Providers now provide, and to do so in a business-like manner rather than a law firm manner. Simple disaggregation is unlikely to be a workable option.
3. An effective business model will require the ability to do “non-legal” work, that is, to solve problems that might end up in the corporation’s law department, but which originate elsewhere.
4. An effective business model will require the ability to solve business problems, even if the problems only tangentially involve legal issues. Clients want problems solved—who does so is not their greatest interest.
5. The combination of 2, 3 and 4 makes the “law firm” model, a business only owned by lawyers that operates on calendar year, cash-basis accounting. Firms must figure out work-arounds to the non-lawyer ownership issue.”

[234] Nigel Wallis, The 7 habits of highly effective law firm leaders, Legal Futures, November 30, 2017; Jim Pagliaro, What Law Firm Partners Lack: The Will to Act, Big Law Business.com (Bloomberg), January 10, 2017; John Olmstead, How Effective Law Firm Leadership Practices can help you Acquire and Keep your Clients, OlmsteadAssoc.com, 2010.

[235] Dan Ciampa, What CEOs Get Wrong About Vision and How to Get it Right, MIT Sloan Management Review, August 29, 2017:

“A leader’s vision — particularly if that leader needs to bring about significant change in the organization — should start as a vivid, credible image of an ideal future state. The clearer a CEO is about what people should do differently to achieve new, challenging objectives, the greater his or her chances of achieving the changes necessary for success. New behavior doesn’t come from missions, however aspirational, but from deep, emotional commitment to doing things differently.”

[236] Nina Kruschwitz, How to be a Strategic Leader, MIT Sloan Management Review, December 12, 2016:

“Strategic leadership can be learned, says Stanford Graduate School of Business’ Jesper Sørensen, and it’s critical to an organization’s long-term success. …

Learning to build a strategic organization involves not just turning a plan into coherent action, but paying attention to organizational culture. A strategic leader knows how to translate an action plan into a “sensible way of thinking about the world” that a group can align with. That in turn helps build a community that is willing and able to work from a shared sense of purpose.”

[237] Ian Holloway, The importance of institutional narrative, Canadian Lawyer, December 18, 2017.

[238] See for example, Mark Cohen, Goodbye Guild – Law’s Changing Culture, Forbes, July 3, 2017; Arnie Herz, what will drive change in law firm culture?, ArnieHarz.com, May 2, 2007; Reena SenGupta, The best law firm innovators alter their culture first, Financial Times, June 1, 2017; Frank Strong, Partner Compensation Models Drive Law Firm Culture, Businesss of Law Blog.com, July 2, 2012;

[239] For example only: Pam Woldow, Lower Revenue? Lower Utilization? Watch Out BigLaw – You Might Be Doing Something Right, LinkedIn, December 27, 2017 – “The bottom line is this: traditional law firm metrics don’t adequately identify the spectrum of benefits effective LPM [Legal Project Management – but for purpose of this example, can be technology, etc] can contribute to law firm success. LPM does indeed represent a paradigm shift in legal service delivery. That shift requires that firms now be willing to look to other metrics to evaluate success – both the firm’s and its individual lawyers’ – and to weigh them against (or at least integrate them with) traditional law firm reporting factors.”

[240] Doug Ready and Alan Mulally, How to Become a Game-Changing Leader, MIT Sloan Management Review, September 8, 2017:

To successfully lead major organizational transformations, executives need to align purpose, performance, and principles within their companies. Doing so isn’t easy — and requires mastery of a wide range of leadership skills. …

At a time when the pace of change in business is faster than ever, we believe that building organizations with these three characteristics is no longer a choice. Being performance-driven is clearly essential to success; continuous disruption, rapid technological innovation, and turbulence require that today’s leaders build agile organizations with resilient employees in order to achieve superior performance.

But focusing on results alone is not enough. Demographic, cultural, and technological changes have led to a workforce that demands a set of operating principles characterized by core values such as transparency, trust, inclusion, and real-time collaboration to help guide behaviors and decision-making in companies. Finally, studies have shown that millennials are deeply motivated by corporate social responsibility and a compelling sense of purpose. Together, these forces make the case that companies that fail to aspire to align purpose, performance, and principles will also fail to attract the best talent. Furthermore, to achieve the kind of transformations that today’s fast-moving economy often requires of businesses, executives need engaged, committed employees who have opportunities to contribute their knowledge. Purpose and principles can help engage employees in support of high performance.”

[241] Joshua Lenon and Bryce Tarling, The Next Phase of Legal Technology Has Already Been Built, Above the Law, December 7, 2017.

[242] Anndam Bhattacharya, Martin Reeves, Nilolaus Lang, Rajah Augustinraj, New Business Models for a New Global Landscape, BCG Henderson Institute, November 14, 2017.

[243] Sandee Magliozzi, How Moving from ‘Best’ to ‘Next’ Practices Can Fuel Innovation, Santa Clara Law Faculty Publications, November 2015.

[244] 2018 Report on the State of the Legal Industry, The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 2018 Georgetown Report’).

[245] Donna Kent, Tomorrow’s law firm is already here, Today!, LinkedIn, October 9, 2017.

[246] M. Jerry McHale, QC, Deregulation: The Changing Legal Services Landscape, UVicAce.com, May 17, 2016. Also see, Patrick Lamb, The Law Firm of the Future, In Search of the Perfect Client Service (Patrick J Lamb.com), January 11, 2018.

[247] Heather Suttie, Legal Markets and Marketing: 10 Trends to Watch and Watch Out for in 2018, Heather Suttie.ca, January 14, 2018.

[248] CBA Legal Futures Initiative, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, Canadian Bar Association, 2014, page 6.

[249] BDO Law Firm Leadership Series 2017, New Law Firm Structures and Models, BDO, September 2017.

[250] Mark Cohen, Postcard from Europe; Part 2: Germany and The Netherlands, Forbes, October 16, 2017.

[251] For example, see Anndam Bhattacharya, Martin Reeves, Nilolaus Lang, Rajah Augustinraj, New Business Models for a New Global Landscape, BCG Henderson Institute, November 14, 2017.

[252] See for example: Heather Suttie, Legal Markets and Marketing: 10 Trends to Watch and Watch Out for in 2018, Heather Suttie.ca, January 14, 2018:

“Traditional law firms won’t fix themselves by themselves. If they could have fixed themselves, the legal industry would have been updated and upgraded long ago.

Solutions enabling the legal industry to survive and thrive will come from accountants, management consultants, engineers, technicians, professional services industry experts, and those with applicable business backgrounds some of whom may have legal understanding and know-how.”

[253] Citibank 2018 Client Advisory: The Legal Market in 2017, 2018 and Beyond, Citi Private Bank and Hildebrandt Consulting LLC, December 2017. [Note: Citibank’s findings on the economic status of the BigLaw business model in U.S. and international]

[254] Georgetown Law and Thomson Reuters Peer Monitor, 2017 Report on the State of the Legal Market, Managing Partner Forum.org, March 17, 2017.

[255] The Future of the Legal Profession, Law Society of Western Australia, December 12, 2017.